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ABSTRACT

Residents of underdeveloped countries who belong to
ethnic, racial, sexual, and political minorities usually endure
relatively ineffective political voices. More than any other world
population segment, these marginalized people are vulnerable
to, and suffer from, compromised health and life expectancies.
Their immense human tolls have spawned severe global
humanitarian, economic, social, political, and security
dilemmas contrary to the strategic interests of the United States.
Despite recognition of these devastating harms here and abroad,
the president as de facto primary U.S. foreign policymaker
continues to formulate foreign health policy in an insular
policymaking environment. The insularity enables the president
to design policy without broad input, transparency, or public
scrutiny. This Article suggests the alterationof the presidential
policymaking apparatus. It proposes a concrete structure to
facilitate a voice for politically marginalized minorities and to
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enhance public accountabilityand transparency in presidential
foreign health policymaking, thereby collaterally imbuing the
process with a new legitimacy.
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A popular government, without popular information,
or the means for acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance:And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives. - James Madison**

I. INTRODUCTION

Residents of underdeveloped countries I who belong to ethnic,
racial, sexual, and political minorities usually endure relatively
ineffective or nonexistent political voices. More than any other world
population segment, these people are vulnerable to, and suffer from,
compromised health and life expectancies. These marginalized people
have received increased international visibility since the onset of
globalization and worldwide recognition that their immense human
tolls have spawned enormous fractures in "critical infrastructures
that sustain the security, stability, and viability of modern nationstates," 2 contrary to the strategic interests of developed countries,
including the United States. 3 Nonetheless, in the de facto role of

** Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, at 103 (Gaillard Hund ed., 1910), quoted in Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 52 (D.D.C. 2002).
1.
Economically underdeveloped "Third World" countries, including those in
Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America, are characterized by economic dependence on
advanced countries, widespread poverty, high birth rates, large populations living in
rural areas, and rural social structures. See, e.g., Gerard Chaliand, Third World,
definitions and descriptions, httpJ/www.thirdworldtraveler.comflravel/Def Third- World.html
(last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
2.
MARK SCHNEIDER & MICHAEL MOODIE, THE DESTABILIZING IMPACTS OF
HIV/AIDS 1 (2002). For further discussion of the global damages, see infra note 71 and
accompanying text.
3.
As a general matter, unless U.S. strategic interests are served, foreign
policies will not be developed and implemented to address concerns of interest groups.
See, e.g., LEE H. HAMILTON, A CREATIVE TENSION: THE FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 44 (2002); Eric M. Uslaner, Cracks in the Armor? Interest
Groups and Foreign Policy, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 355, 357 (Allan J. Cigler &
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primary foreign policymaker, 4 U.S. presidents have failed to act
adequately to forestall these groups' health crises and to avert
consequential damaging global outcomes.
Perhaps it should be no surprise that U.S. presidents have been
mightily deficient in tackling the health needs of such Third World
countries' marginalized residents. In the United States, it is well
documented that even during the past fifty years, the overall health
and life expectancies of politically under-represented ethnic, racial,
and sexual groups-women, gays, African-Americans, HispanicAmericans, Asian-Americans, Pacific-Americans, American Indians,
and Native Alaskans-have been below those of the U.S. population
as a whole. 5 Nonetheless, the medical hardships of these Americans
pale in comparison to the substandard health status of
underdeveloped countries' ethnic, racial, sexual, and political
minorities.
Statistical data regarding health conditions of Third World
women and children confirms this disparity: despite the growth of
gender-targeted
healthcare
programs
available
to
some

Burdett A. Loomis, eds., 2002). For a discussion on U.S. strategic interests affected by
global health matters, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
4.
See infra Parts II, III.
5.
See generally U.S. Department of Heath and Human Services, The Office of
Minority Health, http://www.omhrc.gov (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). These groups'
political under-representation has stemmed from a variety of factors. Some groups,
such as women, share common gender-specific health issues, such as reproductive
health problems and breast and ovarian cancers. Nonetheless, until the women's
liberation movement of the 1960s, women generally had accepted (and if not bowed to
or were subjugated by) the prevalent paternalistic healthcare attitude of their
professional medical provider, who was often a male. Where women's healthcare
interest groups existed, they largely operated as a multitude of small, discrete, and
unattached or loosely connected cadres that lacked funding; aggressive, strong, and
entrepreneurial leadership; and a collective and unified political voice. See Maureen
Casamayou, Collective Entrepreneurism and Breast Cancer Advocacy, in INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS, supra note 3, at 79, 80-83. Moreover, society perceived women's
gender-related medical problems as sexually intimate and therefore socially and
publicly unacceptable discussion topics.
There are many reasons for the generally sub-optimal medical welfare of America's
ethnic groups, such as African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans,
Pacific-Americans, American Indians, and Native Alaskans. The groups' socioeconomic
status has played a role, as has their ancestry. Moreover, as a general matter the
interests of each group are fragmented, as are their political voices. Some of the health
problems from which a particular ethnic or racial group suffers are not common to all
citizens and residents of the United States, making them easier for the broad populace,
the medical establishment, and politicians to ignore. Thus, until recently domestic
health policies and health programs largely have not addressed their particular needs.
Id.
Homosexual men, whose sexual preferences for many years were unacceptable to
mainstream society and thus were relegated to hiding, were and continue to be a
marginalized political group. They have been burdened by HIV/AIDS more than any
other population cohort in America.
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underprivileged women residing in underdeveloped countries, 6 these
women continue to be particularly plagued by high levels of
complications from pregnancy or delivery, many of which result in
lifelong disabilities. Indeed, more than 80,000 women residing in poor
countries annually develop fistula, which leaves them permanently
incontinent and socially ostracized. 7 Women in the Third World also
are particularly susceptible to death from disease and maternal
difficulties. Reports reveal that around the world more than 500,000
women die every year-that is, one woman every minute-from
pregnancy and childbirth complications, such as delays or failures in
obtaining obstetrical care, unsafe abortions, and the lack of access to
drugs. 8 Ninety-nine percent of these deaths occur in low-income
countries. 9 The World Health Organization (WHO) reported in 2005
that more than 500,000 women in underdeveloped countries have
demonstrated particular vulnerability to contagious diseases. 10 They
contract malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS in disproportionately
elevated numbers.1 1 As of 2005, women comprised 45% of all people
(women, men, and children) worldwide living with HIV/AIDS. 12
Women's deaths from contagious diseases are notably high. For
example, on a worldwide basis, tuberculosis accounts for 9% of
13
women's deaths annually.
Children residing in Third World countries are another group
sorely under-represented by political voice who disproportionately

6.
International nongovernmental organizations dedicated to women's human
rights issues and the media have been effective in raising awareness of women's health
issues.
7.
Global Health Council, Women's Health, http://www.globalhealth.org/viewtop.php3?id=225 (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). Fistula is a tear in the birth canal
causing leakage from the bladder or rectum. Id.
8.
Id.; see also World Health Organization, New Global Partnership Will Take
Immediate Action to Help Women and Children Survive, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.who.int/
mediacentretnews/releases/2005/pr41en/. In 2000, there were approximately 68,000
deaths from unsafe abortions, almost half (30,000) of which occurred in Africa. WORLD
HEALTH ORG., UNSAFE ABORTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF
UNSAFE ABORTION AND ASSOCIATED MORTALITY IN 2000, at 13 (4th ed. 2004), available at

httpJ/www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe-abortion-estimates-04/estimates.p
df.
9.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8; Global Health Council, supra note 7.
10.
See Avert.org, Worldwide AIDS & HIV Statistics, http://www.avert.org/
worldstats.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
11.
12.

Id.
UNAIDS, 2006 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC, Core Epidemiology

Slide 1 (2006), http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2O06/2006_GR-Epicore-en.ppt;
Avert.org, supra note 10. Fifty-nine percent of the Sub-Saharan African population
living with HIV/AIDS were women. Id. African women are more than 1.4 times as
likely as men to be infected with HIV/AIDS. Id.
13.
The Henry J. Kaiser Found., TB Largest Infectious Cause of Death Among
Women Worldwide, Conference Attendees Say, Sept. 27, 2005, http://www.kaisernet
work.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=4&DRID=32790.
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suffer from preventable or treatable health issues. 1 4 For example,
each day approximately 6,000 girls, often between the ages of four
and eight living in eastern, central, and western African
communities, the Middle East, and in immigrant communities in
Asia, the Pacific, Latin America, and Europe, are subject to female
genital mutilation. 15 This practice has led to grave psychological and
physical health problems such as organ damage, serious long-term
infection, HIV/AIDS, infertility, and death for an estimated 135
million females.' 6 Across the world, approximately 1,500 children
contract HIV/AIDS every day, 17 and those living primarily in poor
countries now account for one-half of all new HJV/AIDS sufferers
worldwide.18 At the end of 2005, more than 2.3 million children
under age fifteen lived with HIV/AIDS,1 9 and most of these children
resided in the Third World. 20 Strikingly, HIV/AIDS afflicts young
girls in certain countries to a larger measure than boys. For instance,
76% of youths with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa between ages
fifteen and twenty-four are girls. 21 All of these youngsters are
plagued by severe physical and emotional consequences of the
disease.
Children in underdeveloped countries also experience high
mortality rates. 22 The Global Health Council reports that "[e]very
minute of every day, 20 children die somewhere in the world, and
two-thirds of these deaths could be readily averted by existing
preventive and therapeutic strategies." 23 Moreover, of "the 10.8
million children under age five who die each year, 10 million (more

14.
The weak political status of children is attributable in some part to the inability
of children to form international human rights groups to represent their interests.
Accordingly, even compared to women, their health issues stemming from poverty, poor
nutrition, lack of education, and inferior healthcare are hugely burdensome. UNAIDS &
WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 2 (2004), available at http://www.
reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LHON-69TDCG/$FILE/AIDSUpdateUNAIDS Dec_2004.
pdf?OpenElement.
15.
Amnesty Int'l, What is female genital mutilation?, http://www.amnesty.orgl
ailib/intcanifemgerifgm1.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
16.
Id. Two million girls a year are at risk of genital mutilation. Id.
17.
UNAIDS, supra note 12, at Core Epidemiology Slide 10.
18.
UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14, at 4.
19.
Avert.org, supra note 10. The number of AIDS orphans is horrific; in 2005
there were 12 million in Africa alone. Id.
20.
Id.
21.
UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14, at 4.
22.
The troublesome childhood mortality in underdeveloped countries results
from conditions associated with poverty, including unsafe drinking water,
malnutrition, poor sanitation, absence of prenatal care, inadequate diets, and lack of
healthcare to prevent or treat infectious diseases. Global Health Council, Child Health,
http://www.globalhealth.org/printview.php3?id=226 (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
23.
Id. Recently, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation announced that it
donated $84 million to two charities that work to prevent needless deaths of infants
within the first several days of their births. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The Gateses
Give $84 Million To Help Prevent Infant Deaths, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2005, at A12.
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than 92 percent) resided in the lower-income countries. '24 Childhood
mortality from HIV/AIDS, largely acquired from mothers during
birthing or breast feeding, 25 is exceedingly high. By 2000, about 4.3
26
million children younger than age fifteen had died from HIV/AIDS.
In 2005 alone, estimates reveal that between 290,000 and 500,000
27
children under fifteen years old died of HIV/MDS.
These small glimpses into just two politically under-represented
population segments living in underdeveloped countries suggest the
magnitude of various health maladies that impact numerous such
groups. They beg us to ask how our nation's leading foreign
policymaker permits such tragedies to continue unabated despite
U.S. strategic interests to the contrary. 28 The story of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic is revealing.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic reared its ugly head in Africa and the
Caribbean more than two decades ago 29 before striking politically
under-represented minorities of developing and developed countries,
including the United States. 30 President Ronald Reagan was aware of
the mounting HIV/ATDS problem at home and abroad as early as
1983. 31 Nonetheless, he and his administration discounted the
evidence, denied the disease's potentialities, and failed to react. 32 For
almost two decades thereafter, presidents (and other policymakers)
largely ignored the rapidly growing HIV/AIDS crises. 33 The reasons for
their inaction are based on attitudes, information, and politics.
Initially, in the U.S. HIV/AIDS was viewed as a disease primarily
affecting the domestic gay population, a minority affinity group with
little political clout in the early 1980s. Moreover, the disease was then
considered exclusively sexually transmitted. 34 Persons who contracted
HIV/AIDS were viewed as foolishly having engaged in risky behavior

24.
Global Health Council, supra note 22.
25.
Id. Blood factors, such as hemophilia and blood transfusions, account for
some cases of HIV/AIDS. Avert.org, Can you get AIDS from... ?, http://www.avert.org/
howcan.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
26.
Nat'l Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, The Evidence That HIV
Causes AIDS, Feb. 27, 2003, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/evidhiv.htm.
27.
UNAIDS, supra note 12, at Core Epidemiology Slide 8.
28.
See GREG BEHRMAN, THE INVISIBLE PEOPLE: HOW THE U.S. HAS SLEPT
THROUGH THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC, THE GREATEST HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE
OF OUR TIME 5-8, 11-13 (2004).
29.
See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
30.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 5-8, 11-13.
31.
Id.

32.
Id.
33.
Id. Domestic and foreign policy regarding HIV/AIDS are inextricably
connected, as are many policy areas. See, e.g., Ernest J. Wilson, III., Interest Groups
and Foreign Policymaking: A View from the White House, in THE INTEREST GROUP

CONNECTION 238, 243 (Paul S. Herrnson et al. eds., 1998).
34.
Later, it was learned that transmission of HIV/ADS also occurred by
tainted blood supplies, birthing or breastfeeding by an infected mother, and other
means. Avert.org, supra note 25.
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preventable by sexual abstinence or precautionary measures. In other
words, a prevalent attitude was that these individuals got what they
deserved. As the drug-addicted population became victims of the
disease as a result of their use of contaminated needles, stigmatization
mounted. Superimposing these stigmas on top of racial and ethnic
biases associated with the disease's probable African origin3 5 further
tainted perspectives of the populations affected by HIV/AIDS abroad.
Some African leaders reinforced U.S. presidents' ignorance about the
epidemic proportions of HIV/AIDS by denying that HIV/AIDS was a
36
major health issue among both heterosexuals and homosexuals.
Additionally, presidents faced with constituents' opinions and perhaps
a desire for reelection conceivably felt paralyzed.3 7 Thus, presidents'
personal homophobic, ethnic, and racial biases; their sentiments about
drug addiction; their lack of knowledge; 3s and their desires for the
electorates' votes clouded their perceptions of HIV/AIDS and
contributed to policymaking inaction. 39 Unfortunately, their disregard
contributed to an immense and persistent human toll in the United
States and abroad and to unprecedented global humanitarian,
economic, social, political, and security dilemmas contrary to U.S.
40
strategic interests.
The active engagement of the White House in politically underrepresented minorities' emerging and recognized world health
challenges is imperative to the creation and implementation of
appropriate foreign health policies. 41 As one government official

35.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 15-16. But see Rebecca Voelker, HIV/AIDS in
the Caribbean:Big Problems Among Small Islands, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2961, 2962
(2001) (indicating reports of the Caribbean Epidemiology Center suggest that
HIV/AIDS first emerged in Jamaica in 1982).
36.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 206 (indicating that African leaders finally
broke their silence around 2001).

37.
But see ERIC ALTERMAN, WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA? WHY DEMOCRACY
MATTERS IN FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1998) (suggesting that elections occur too infrequently
to greatly affect much foreign policy decision-making).
38.
Some transmission of HIV/AIDS occurred as a result of tainted blood
supplies, birthing, or breastfeeding by infected mothers. Avert.org, supra note 25.
39.
Unlike the innocent Tsunami victims, to whom the U.S. government
reacted rather quickly in 2004, the sufferers of HIV/AIDS may have been viewed as
bringing their own fates upon themselves by inappropriate and avoidable sexual
activities. For a discussion of the U.S. government's initial funding offer to assist the
Tsunami victims and the outside pressures brought on the U.S. government to increase
its financial support, see, for example, Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Nearly Triples Tsunami
Aid Pledge, to $950 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A3; Alan Cowell, Pressure
Grows for Rich Nations to Redouble Effort to Aid Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2005, at
A3; Celia W. Dugger, U.N. Proposes Doubling of Aid to Cut Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2005, at Al.

40.
See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
41.
Domestic and foreign policies are inextricably entangled; what the
president does with foreign policy easily might affect aspects of domestic policy. See,
e.g., Wilson, supranote 33, at 238, 243. For example, Americans are acutely aware that
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stated in 2003, the HIV/AIDS story makes it clear that "the
government cannot do it alone. Not only do we have limited resources,
but we don't always have the best answers and solutions. Indeed,
people and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] can often best
address the many challenges [together] here at home and throughout
the world." 42 The government official's admission that the
government is not omnipotent and cannot be effective in
accomplishing crucial policy tasks alone underscores the vital need
for structural changes in presidential foreign health policymaking
43
processes.
In A Voice for Nonprofits, 44 John M. Berry and David F. Arons
analyze the potential effectiveness of the joint production of policy by
U.S. policymakers and nonprofit interest groups and organizations.
Drawing from the research of other scholars, 4 5 they view nonprofits
as "service bureaus" that can assist the government by anticipating
needs, providing research and information, offering perspectives, and
giving technical and financial support. 4 6 This has long been borne
out. U.S.-based public charities and domestic private foundations
have an extensive history of facilitating U.S. interests and of serving
under-represented groups in the United States and abroad. 47 They
have championed new ideas and programs and have been
instrumental in recognizing and responding to sudden, as well as
ongoing, needs of marginalized people when the U.S. government has
48
failed to do so, sometimes despite national interests to the contrary.
Thus, through their missions, economic support, and activities,
domestic nonprofits have privately designed unofficial foreign policy
49
that profoundly has impacted foreign affairs.

foreign trade policy impacts jobs at home and that foreign policies of varying natures
affect national security policy. Id.
42.
Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Remarks to the Fund
for American Studies, Jan. 18, 2003, http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm2003/17895.htm.
43.
There are other areas of concern, such as the environment, in which U.S.
foreign policymaking processes might benefit from structural changes. Id.
44.
JEFFREY M. BERRY WITH DAVID F. ARONS, A VOICE FOR NONPROFITS 130-45
(2003).
45.
Id. at 143 (citing RAYMOND A. BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL & LEWIS
ANTHONY DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 350-57 (1972)).
46.
Id. at 137-45.
47.
See Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass:Assessing
the Roles of Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by
Private Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 17-18 (2003) [hereinafter
Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass]; Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of
a Private Foundation's Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further
Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1095-96 (2001). Additionally, it is common for I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4) advocacy organizations to represent interests of minority groups.
48.
See BERRY WITH ARONS, supra note 44, at 130-45.
49.
Much of the literature focuses on domestic private foundations. See
EDWARD H. BERMAN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE CARNEGIE, FORD, AND ROCKEFELLER
FOUNDATIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE IDEOLOGY OF PHILANTHROPY 41-55
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Nonetheless, there has never been an official role for nonprofits
in a president's foreign health policymaking apparatus. 50 The lack of
such a formal structure effectively has maintained the two sectors'
51
independence. While sector autonomy has important advantages,
this Article's subsequent tale of the lengthy road to constructing U.S.
foreign policy for HIV/AIDS and its discussion of the presidential
52
policymaking structure highlight downsides.
The Article focuses on presidential foreign policymaking
structures largely because in modern times the president has been
the dominant foreign policymaker. 53 And, whether involving global
health or another policy area, the president rather easily can
maintain insular perspectives and inalterable policy positions
without broad public accountability and transparency. 54 Thus, absent
structural changes to the presidential foreign policymaking approach,
the president is vulnerable to making foreign policy that does not
satisfy national interests.

(1983); WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 54-57, 60-61, 80 (1972); JOAN
ROELOFS, FOUNDATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-5, 38-40, 52-53, 139-43, 157-206
(2003); RENE WORMSER, FOUNDATIONS: THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE 200, 204-205,

209 (1958); Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass, supra note 47, at 1718; Gary R. Hess, Waging the Cold War in the Third World: The Foundationsand the
Challenges of Development, in CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 319, 319-39 (Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie eds., 2003). See
infra note 209 and accompanying text (regarding the private design of foreign policy).
50.
One Filer Commission Research Paper suggests logical reasons that private
philanthropic institutions should be involved in public affairs. Adam Yarmolinsky,
PhilanthropicActivity in InternationalAffairs, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS: PHILANTHROPIC
FIELDS OF INTEREST 761, 817-19 (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public
Needs, 1977) (suggesting a defined relationship with the government can reduce
government costs and aggravations; speed responses to crises when necessary; operate
as a means of incubating new ideas and processes; and provide a conscience, viewpoint,
or reasoning otherwise not part of the governmental structure).
51.
See Nina J. Crimm, Democratization, Global Grant-Making, and the
Internal Revenue Code Lobbying Restrictions, 79 TUL. L. REV. 587, 593-94 (2005)
(describing private foundations' outreach efforts and financial aid for human rights and
humanitarian causes, health and education initiatives, economic development
programs, and other foreign affairs matters during the Cold War and post-Cold War
periods); Yarmolinsky, supra note 50, at 775-76 (noting that private foundations as
private funding sources may meet with less resistance by foreign countries than
funding from the U.S. government).
52.
See infra Part II.
53.
See infra Part III.
54.
Foreign policymaking depends not only on the formal government
structures formulated under the U.S. Constitution and on the exercise of those powers
by the executive and legislative branches, but also on the particular individuals
involved in the processes. The literature is replete with stories of the impact of various
presidents; Secretaries of State, such as John Foster Dulles; and Congressional leaders
on the making of U.S. foreign policy. While personalities significantly influence the
formulation and development of foreign policy, this Article focuses instead on
institutional and governmental relationships.
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The Article suggests alteration of the presidential foreign
policymaking system to address global health matters affecting the
well-being and very existence of marginalized minorities throughout
the world. To illustrate why structural changes are required, Part II
reviews the two decades of lost opportunities for inclusion of
HIV/AIDS as a U.S. foreign policy priority. Thereafter, Part III
provides a brief overview of the official foreign policy decision-making
structure. The Article next presents in Part IV practical reasons for
formally adding domestic nonprofit organizations as official actors in
the presidential foreign health policymaking processes. In Part V, the
Article reviews several existing paradigms that provide formal
arrangements for the participation of NGOs in various international
bodies charged with rule making and policymaking authority, such as
the International Labor Organization formal NGO "association"
structure, 55 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development formal advisory committee system, 56 and the
consultative status of NGOs to the United Nations (U.N.) Economic
and Social Council. 57 These paradigms feature certain attractive
attributes that the Article identifies as important to incorporate in a
presidential foreign health policymaking arrangement. The Article
attempts to fit these qualities into a constitutionally acceptable
structure that will permit domestic nonprofits to be official voices of
politically marginalized minorities in presidential foreign health
policymaking. To this end, the Article proposes a pair of new
structures. In brief, the Article first suggests the president's
establishment of a Presidential Advisory Committee on U.S. Foreign
Health Policy, composed of representatives from the nonprofit sector.
It then proposes the creation of an Assembly on Nonprofit Entities to
give broad voice to nonprofits with expertise and experience in global
health matters and to present to presidential advisors on a new
Presidential Advisory Committee the nonprofits' insights, research,
and recommendations.

55.
See infra Part V.A.4.
56.
See HENRY G. AUBREY, ATLANTIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: THE CASE OF
THE OECD 131 (1967) (OECD has formal relationships with nongovernmental
organizations in the form of advisory committees, including its Business and Industry
Advisory Committee (BIAC) and Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC)). For
further discussion, see infra Part V.A.5.
57.
Article 71 of the United Nations Charter to the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) provides authority for consultative status of nongovernmental
organizations. U.N. Charter art. 71; see E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N. DOC. EfRES/1996/31
(July 25 1996). For further discussion, see infra Part V.A.6.
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II. THE HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC

A. Overview
As HIV/AIDS 58 gripped the world, U.S. government policymakers were not prepared for, and did not readily react to, its
appearance.5 9 Twenty-five years later, HIV/AIDS had "already killed
more people than all the soldiers killed in the major wars of the
twentieth century, and equals the toll taken by the bubonic plague in
1347. '' 60 Since its known inception 25 years ago, the AIDS causing
virus, HIV, has infected in excess of 65 million people, and AIDS has
killed approximately 25 million people worldwide (that is, an average
of 1 million individuals annually).61 While there is a sense that the
spread of HIV/AIDS appears under control in affluent countries, 62 the
pandemic currently continues without apparent abatement in poor
and developing countries, 63 despite the global funding response to the
HIV/AIDS crisis since 2001.64 Approximately 38.6 million individuals
live with HIV/AIDS, and between 3.4 million and 6.2 million people
were newly infected with HIV in 2005.65 The United Nations AIDS
(UNAIDS) 2006 report reveals that approximately 65% of all global

58.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is a retrovirus recognized as the
etiologic agent of its most severe disease manifestation, Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). See AIDSINFO, GLOSSARY OF HIV/AIDS-RELATED TERMS 57 (5th ed.
2005), available at http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/GlossaryH1V-related Terms-Fifth
Edition-en.pdf.
59.
For further discussion of the U.S. government's response to AIDS, see infra
Part II.B.
60.
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, HIV/AIDS AS A SECURITY ISSUE 1 (2001), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report-archive/A400321_19062001.pdf
(citing David Gordon, U.S National Intelligence Council, Remarks at a Briefing at the
United States Institute of Peace (May 8, 2001) and providing data up to mid.2001).
61.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at xi. In 2001 alone, 3 million people died
from AIDS and 5 million more were infected by HIV/AIDS. UNITED NATIONS FOUND.,
PHILANTHROPY FOR HIV/AIDS 1 (2003), available at http://www.global-philanthropy.
orgfbriefguides/ hiv.pdf. The infection rate in Botswana alone is nearly 40% of the
adult population. Id.
62.
See Catherine Boone & Jake Batsell, Politics and AIDS in Africa: Research
Agendas in PoliticalScience and InternationalRelations, 48.2 AFR. TODAY 3, 4 (2001).
63.
John C. Gannon, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications
for the United States, Jan. 2000, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/www.cia.gov/
www.cia.gov/cia/reports/nie/report/nie99-17d.html; GlobalHealthReporting.Org, Facts
at a Glance, http://www.globalhealthreporting.org/diseaseinfo.asp?id=23 (last visited Sept.
7, 2006) (reporting that globally 38.6 million people lived with HLV/AIDS at year end
2005, 4.1 million adults and children were newly infected by HIV/AIDS in 2005, and
2.8 million adults and children died in 2005, the largest percentage of which occurred
in Sub-Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia).
64.
UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14, at 5.
65.
UNAIDS, supra note 12, at Core Epidemiology Slides 1-2.
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victims infected with HIV live in Africa. 66 A 2004 U.N. report found
that the number of people living with HIV in East Asia rose nearly
50% between 2002 and 2004.67 Despite antiretroviral therapies, the
range of daily deaths worldwide attributed to the disease is 7,6008,000 individuals, 68 a statistic that dwarfs the number of human
69
fatalities from war or other causes.
The HIV/AIDS threat to world development and security exceeds
all other known hazards, "with the possible exceptions of use of
nuclear weapons in densely populated areas or a devastating global
pandemic similar to the 1917-18 influenza episode." 70 It has
profoundly harmed human capital, health systems, family structures,
social stability, labor productivity, natural resource development,
business investments, national economies, political leadership, and
political and military security throughout the world that now are
perceived as directly connected to key strategic U.S. national
interests. 71 To avoid similar devastating repercussions from

66.
See id. at Core Epidemiology Slide 3.
67.
UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14, at 2.
68.
See UNAIDS, supra note 12, at Core Epidemiology Slide 1; UNAIDS &
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14, at 1; BEHRMAN, supranote 28, at xi.
69.
See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 60, at 1.
70.
Dean T. Jamison, Investing in Health, in DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3, 13 (Dean T. Jamison et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006).
71.
Global disease is seen as central to U.S. national security, U.S. global reach as a
result of military deployment, U.S. trade relations, and domestic public health. See INT'L
CRISIS GROUP, supra note 60, at i-ii, 2-4, 9-12, 17, 21-23; INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, GENEVA,
HIV/AIDS: A THREAT TO DECENT WORK, PRODUCTIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT 7-22 (2000),
available at http://www.ilo.orgpublic/english/protection/trav/aids/publ/threatdecent workeng.pdf;
JORDAN S. KASSALOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WHY HEALTH IS IMPORTANT TO

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2001), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachmentsWhy-Health-Is-Important-To-Foreign-Policy.pdf; SCHNEIDER & MOODIE, supra
note 2, at 1, 3-12; JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN ET AL., ON THE BRINK: WEAK STATES AND U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY 1-3, 14-16 (2004); Paul V. Applegarth, Capital Market and Financial
Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, in RISING U.S. STAKES IN AFRICA: SEVEN
PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-AFRICA POLICY 23, 26 (Ctr. for Strategic and Intl Studies,

2004); Erica Barks-Ruggles, Meeting the Global Challenge of HIV/AIDS, in POLICY BRIEF
1-5 (The Brookings Inst., No. 75, 2001), available at http://www.brookings.educomm/
policybriefs/pb75.pdf; Erica Barks-Ruggles et al., The Economic Impact of HIVIAIDS in
Southern Africa, in CONFERENCE REPORT 1-6 (The Brookings Inst. Policy Brief, No. 9,
2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/ conferencereportcr09.pdf; Barbara
Boxer, Providing Basic Human Security, 26 WASH. Q. 199, 200-03 (2003); Funders
Concerned About Aids, Innovative Partnershipsin the Fight Against Global HIV/AIDS, in
CORPORATE UPDATE 1 (2003); Gannon, supra note 63, at 1, 5-7, 31-34; Jeff Gow, The
HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy, 21 HEALTH AFF. 57, 66-67
(2002); Amar A. Hamoudi & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Economics of AIDS in Africa, in AIDS IN
AFRICA 676, 676-82 (Max Essex et al. eds., 2002); Alan Ingram, The New Geopolitics of
Disease:Between Global Health and Global Security, 10 GEOPOLITICS 522, 522-41 (2005); J.
Stephen Morrison, The African Pandemic Hits Washington, 24 WASH. Q. 197, 197-98
(2001); Robin Wright & Edwin Chen, Bush Turns His Attention to Africa, L.A. TIMES, July
8, 2003, at Al.

George Tenet, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, captured the
AIDS crises in his testimony before Congress:
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inadequate or symbolic responses to other global health issues that
impact ethnic, racial, sexual, and other political minorities, it is worth
reviewing how the global HJV/AIDS problem reached its epic
72
proportions.

B. The Story of HIV/AIDS
1.

In the Beginning, Response Avoidance

As early as 1981, U.S. government health officials knew the HIV
virus had infected African and American populations. 73 Records of the
Center for Disease Control (C.D.C.) indicate that HIV plagued
hundreds of Americans at that time; 74 as many as 339 cases were
diagnosed in the United States in 1981 alone.7 5 As of February 1983,
76
the C.D.C. had reported 1,000 AIDS victims in the United States.
Avert.org, an international AIDS charity, reports that between 1981
and the end of 1983 in the United States 4,793 cases of AIDS had
been diagnosed and 2,137 individuals had died from AIDS, a fatality

[F]or a continent like Africa, the devastating quality of what [AIDS] does to
civil life: How it undermines leadership structures, how it just basically takes
generations out of play, can't be understated....
And then you have refugee flows, and then you have economic disasters, and
then you have civil wars that . . . require exfiltration and some kind of
involvement whether you choose to or not.
And while we all believe we're immune from all this, we're not immune from all
this.... [Alt some point, somebody has to be responsible for [it].
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 63 (2001) (testimony of George Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency).
72.
Symbolic governmental responses could raise ethical issues, such as
whether the government's actions were taken to mislead the public rather than to
sincerely address the health issues and whether such government behavior spawns
public distrust of the government that can be damaging both in the short- and longterms.
73.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 5. Most reports suggest that HIV/AIDS
emerged in the Caribbean in the 1970s or early 1980s. Voelker, supra note 35, at 2962.
74.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 6.
75.
Avert.org, United States AIDS Cases & Deaths by Year, http://www.avert.
org/usastaty.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
76.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 6. Avert.org reports that in 1983 there were
3,153 new cases of AIDS diagnosed and 1,511 deaths from AIDS. Avert.org, supra note
75. In the U.S., there were nearly 151,400 diagnosed cases of AIDS and 90,628 deaths
from AIDS by the end of the 1980s. See id. But see BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 25
(reporting approximately 115,000 diagnosed cases in the United States and more than
70,000 deaths from AIDS by the end of the 1980s).
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rate of approximately 44%. 77 By contrast, the widely publicized
outbreak of Legionnaires' Disease in 1976 in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, infected 221 people and killed 34, a fatality rate of less
than

15%.78

Global surveillance by the WHO revealed a real international
epidemic by 1983. HIV/AIDS cases were known in Canada, fifteen
European countries, Haiti, Zaire, seven Latin American countries,
Australia, and Rwanda. 79 Despite President Reagan's awareness of
the HIV/AIDS crisis here and abroad, in 1983 his administration
refused to acknowledge the dimensions of the HIV/AIDS global
crisis.80 No steps were taken to develop domestic or foreign policy to
8
address the HTV/AIDS predicament. '
2.

The Mid- to Late-1980s

By the end of 1986, eighty-five countries reported a total of
38,401 HIV/AIDS-identified cases.8 2 Of these cases, 2,323 were in
Africa, 31,741 were in the Americas, 3,858 were in Europe, 395 were
83
in Oceania, and 84 were in Asia.
As the number of HIV/AIDS cases rose in the mid-1980s, gay
activist groups and other nonprofit organizations,8 4 as well as the
media, 8 5 were instrumental in raising public awareness of the disease
but perhaps not extensive sympathy for the activists' cause or for

77.
See Avert.org, supra note 75. Another source reported that by the end of
1983 the number of AIDS cases in the United States had risen to 3,064 and of these,
1,292 had died. See Avert.org, The History of Aids: 1981-1986, www.avert.orgfhis8l
.86.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
78.
See Legionnaires' Disease, http://www.multiline.com.auJ-mg/legion5.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
79.
See Avert.org, supra note 77. Additionally, two suspected cases of
HIV/AIDS had been reported in Japan. Id.
80.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 13.
81.
Id.
82.
Avert.org, supra note 77.
83.
Id. The number of reported cases of HIV/AIDS in Africa today far exceeds
those in the Americas. Compared to 1986, this reversal may be the result of the
underreporting of cases in Africa in the 1980s and the lesser availability of medical
treatments to African populations today as compared to people residing in North
America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Id.
84.
The nonprofit sector initially was not cohesive in its support. By and large,
universities and think tanks, the traditional grantees of elite and rich private
foundations, were not requesting grants for AIDS research and studies, and most
private foundations were not comfortable with funding AIDS initiatives. The
discomfort was largely grounded in personal homophobic biases of the philanthropic
institutions' leaders or concern about how homophobia would affect outsiders'
perceptions of their philanthropies. See Martha B. Gibbons, Who Funded AIDS? The
Role of Funders Concerned About AIDS - Grantmakers as Advocates and Activists,
NONPROFIT SECTOR RES. FUND WORKING PAPER SERIES, Spring 1999, at 2, available at
http://www.nonprofitresearch.org/usr-doc/15874.pdf.
85.
Id.
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those individuals infected. Nonetheless, several private foundations,
such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the foundations of
Michael Milken and David Geffen, began to support AIDS
initiatives. 86 Gay activist nonprofits prominently funded research and
other HIV/AIDS initiatives. 87 In 1987, 88 some professional staff
members of elite private foundations were motivated to increase
philanthropic resources and "to mobilize philanthropic leadership,
ideas and resources, domestically and internationally, to eradicate
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to address its social and economic
consequences." 8 9 Thus, they formed a new nonprofit organization, the
Funders Concerned About AIDS (F.C.A.A.).
In 1988, the Ford
Foundation created a collaborative funding pool for AIDS initiatives;
the National Community AIDS Partnership (now known as the
National AIDS Fund), which raised large sums from community,
corporate, and national foundations for AIDS projects in cities and
states across the United States over the following eight years. 90
Without the support of these nonprofit organizations, HIV/AIDS
initiatives would have been largely devoid of aid. The U.S
government lacked interest in policy development with respect to
HIV/AIDS and failed to fund9 HTV/AIDS efforts either domestically
or globally. 92
The Department of State appeared relatively
unconcerned about the HIV/AIDS problem abroad. 93 Similarly, the
Surgeon General did not demonstrate serious interest in the domestic
or global HIV/AIDS crisis. 94 In 1986, Congress appropriated a paltry
$2 million to address the worldwide impact of HIV/AIDS. 95 Although
in 1987 President Reagan appointed a Presidential Advisory Council
96
on AIDS, it purportedly amounted to an "empty political gesture,"

86.
Id. at 2, 17. In 1986, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation committed $17.1
million to fund the AIDS Health Services Program, and in 1988 it contributed $16.7
million to fifty-four AIDS projects in twenty-six states. Id. at 17.
87.
Id. at 16.
88.
Id. at 2-3.
89.
Funders Concerned About AIDS, About FCAA, http://www.fcaaids.org/
about/AboutMission.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
90.
Gibbons, supra note 84, at 18. The National Community AIDS Partnership
was a powerful national-local partnership involving community foundations and other
funders. Id.
91.
The $2 million was allotted through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) to the World Health Organization's Special
Program on AIDS (SPA), which adopted, but did not implement, a Global Strategy for
Prevention and Control of AIDS. BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 44, 47-48.
92.
For discussion of the influence of private foundations generally on
governmental policymakers, see infra Part V.
93.

BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 18.

94.
Id. at 28.
95.
Id. at 16-17.
96.
Id. at 28. President Reagan spoke of AIDS as the number one domestic
public health problem, but neither forcefully pushed for solutions nor suggested that it
was a global health problem. Id. Although Vice President Bush attended the Third
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symbolic at best. 97 Thus, essentially during the first decade of the
HIV/AIDS onslaught, governmental officials largely ignored the
growing magnitude of the health epidemic and its need for a place on
the policymaking agenda.
3.

The Early- to the Mid-1990s

As Presidential candidate William J. Clinton campaigned across
the United States in 1992, he declared HIV/AIDS a domestic crisis
but was silent as to its global impact. 98 By the time of his January 21,
1993 inaugural speech, he proclaimed that the HIV/AIDS crisis
abroad presented a challenge to the United States. 99 In 1994,
President Clinton appointed Patricia Fleming as national AIDS policy
director. 100 Despite President Clinton's speeches and appointments,
no real White House policymaking action followed. 101 Nonprofit
organizations, such as F.C.A.A. and New York City's ACT UP,
attempted to further elevate the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the
consciences of the U.S. public and government officials. 102 Some
F.C.A.A. internationally oriented funders, including the Rockefeller,

Annual International AIDS Conference in 1987, during his subsequent candidacy for,
and his subsequent term as, President, he did little to address AIDS as a global
problem. See id. at 29, 30 (stating that AIDS as a global problem was largely ignored
by the Bush administration).
97.
See supra note 72 (mentioning the ethics of symbolic governmental
response).
98.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 97-98 (discussing Mr. Clinton's focus on
HIV/AIDS as a domestic issue during his presidential campaign).
99.
Id. at 100.
100.
See Marlene Cimons, Clinton Appoints AIDS Policy Director; Health:
Patricia Fleming Sees Added Difficulties in Getting Ample Funds From Congress.
President Vows to Make Fight Against the Ailment a High Priority,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1994, at A34.

101.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 100 (discussing President Clinton's lack of
interest in foreign policy, and criticizing the selection of his foreign policy team); see
also infra Part III.A.2. (commenting on the failure of persons in executive branch
agencies to persuade President Clinton to place HIV/AIDS on the foreign policy
agenda).
Although President Clinton did not formulate a domestic or foreign policy for
dealing with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, his failure certainly did not result from a
personal bias toward homosexuals. Indeed, in 1993, President Clinton attempted to lift
the ban on gays to serve openly in the U.S. military. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, A
General Talks to Bush: 'Yes, Sir! But,' N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, § 4, at 4. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, with General Colin L. Powell as a leading advocate, blocked President
Clinton's proposal which, they asserted, threatened "good order and discipline" in the
ranks. Id. Ultimately, the "don't ask, don't tell" policy emerged. Id. See also Editorial,
Pursuethe Gay-Baiting Commanders, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1994, at A22 (criticizing the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy as falling short of President Clinton's goal).
102.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 122-23; Gibbons, supra note 84, at 14-15,
20. New York City's gay and lesbian activist organization, ACT UP, engaged in brain
storming sessions and protests with other global activist organizations to bring
attention to the AIDS pandemic. BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 122-23.
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Ford, and MacArthur foundations, supported global AIDS related
issues and programs. 10 3 The National Community AIDS Partnership
raised substantial amounts of funding for domestic community AIDS
projects. 104 Nonetheless, there was little appreciation by key
governmental policymakers that HTV/AIDS should
be a crucial
10 5
ingredient in U.S. domestic and foreign policies.
4.

The Mid- to Late-1990s and the New Millennium

It was not until the beginning of the new millennium that U.S.
domestic and foreign policy advanced full throttle to include
HIV/AIDS. The confluence of many factors and the efforts of many
individuals in the mid- and late-1990s spurred the movement. In the
mid- and late-1990s, political activism aimed at pushing domestic
HTV/AIDS policies surged. 106 The domestic private philanthropic
community widely appreciated HIV/AIDS as a global crisis. 107 A
particularly important year was 1996: in that year, UNAIDS was
formed, and it quickly became a leading authority on global
HIV/AIDS. 108 It scored successes in stimulating U.S. and global
responses to the HIV/AIDS crisis abroad. 10 9 Also in 1996, the medical
world recognized anti-retroviral drugs as an effective therapy for
HIV/AIDS. 1 10 The availability of this treatment helped to galvanize
HTV/AIDS advocates who likely saw the therapeutic, albeit expensive,
elixir as the hope for the many still living HIV/AIDS victims

103.
See Gibbons, supra note 84, at 27 (noting that funding for international
AIDS-related initiatives was the "least often funded type of grant reported in 1993").
104.
See id. at 18 (stating that NCAP generated more than $50 million).
105.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 74. A variety of reasons have been reported:
the view that AIDS was initially a taboo homosexual sex issue that later extended to a
taboo heterosexual intimate relations issue; the decline of AIDS in the United States;
the disengagement of the United States in foreign affairs; the reduction in U.S. foreign
aid generally and particularly to Africa, which did not figure greatly into the U.S.
perception of strategic interests; the silence of African governmental leaders and
political communities, which amounted to a denial of an AIDS problem; the failure of
African-American leaders to actively voice concern; the lack of U.S. support for the
United Nations (U.N.) and the U.N.'s disjointed programs; and the media's lack of
serious coverage. See id. at 84-85, 88, 171, 178-85, 206.
106.
Id. at 90-92; see also Gibbons, supra note 84, at 21-22 (discussing attempts
of funders and activists to shape AIDS public policy).
107.
An F.C.A.A. Gallup survey indicated domestic philanthropic institutions'
awareness of, and concern for, the global HIV/AIDS crisis, but noted that there was
limited funding by these organizations for the cause. FUNDERS CONCERNED ABOUT
AIDS, PHILANTHROPY AND AIDS: ASSESSING THE PAST, SHAPING THE FUTURE 23-24
(1999).
108.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 126, 166-69 (discussing the success of
UNAIDS in drawing attention to AIDS as a global health problem).
109.
Id.
110.
Id. at 134.
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worldwide. 111 Moreover, the Rockefeller Foundation launched the
International Aids Vaccine Initiative. 112 The year ended well for
those favoring a prominent place for HIV/AIDS on the domestic and
foreign policy agendas. In December, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright commissioned a State Department report on the HIV/AIDS
113
pandemic.
Between 1999 and 2000, attention focused increasingly on the
global HIV/AIDS crisis. In 2000, Vice President Al Gore presided over
114
a special session on Africa and health at the U.N. Security Council.
There, armed with information that the HIV/AIDS pandemic was
creating world instability and security crises, 115 Vice President Gore
injected HIV/AIDS into the highest levels of political discourse. 116 As
a result, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution to press
national leaders to become more engaged in the global HIV/AIDS
catastrophe.117
In 2000 and 2001, nonprofit organizations and the U.S.
government published studies and research papers that proclaimed
the global HIV/AIDS pandemic neither to be confined to a narrow
geographic area nor to a health issue. 118 These and subsequent
publications suggested HIV/AIDS to be a destabilizing threat to the
economic, political, social, and security interests of both developing
and developed countries. 119 These publications prompted the
attention of the U.S. government, 120 which then came to view

See id. (stating that the availability of effective drug therapy was a catalyst
111.
for change in the activist community).
Id. at 129.
112.
Id. at 213.
113.
See id. at 163-64 (discussing Al Gore's part in the U.N. Security Council
114.
session).
Leon Fuerth, National Security Advisor to Al Gore when he was a
115.
presidential candidate, advised Mr. Gore of security problems attributable to the AIDS
pandemic and suggested financial assistance for combating AIDS. See id. at 146-59,
229-36.
116.
Id. at 164.
117.
Id.
See id. at 179; see, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 60; KASSALOW,
118.
supra note 71; Gannon, supra note 63.
119.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 179. Although the worst of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic was centered in Africa, HIV/AIDS threatened the economic stability of Asia
and Russia as well. See id. at 191-93; see also WEINSTEIN ETAL., supra note 71, at 1-3,
14-16 (relating continuing U.S. security, human capacity, and other concerns resulting
from global HIV/AIDS and recommending policy means for addressing the issues).
See, e.g., Boxer, supra note 71, at 199-207; Gow, supra note 71, at 57-68;
120.
Morrison, supra note 71, at 197; Robert A. Rosenblatt, Rich Nations Must Help Fight
AIDS, Clinton Says; Britain: President Declares Drug Companies Need Funds to
Develop Vaccines to Combat Diseases in Poor Countries, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at
A21; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Congress Awakens to AIDS With a Convert's Zeal, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2002, at 1.1; Robin Wright & Faye Fiore, Clinton Touts Global
Engagement; Foreign Policy: President Urges Americans to Support a More Active U.S.
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HIV/AIDS as a potential harm to development and democracy and a
force possibly causing states' failures by destroying their
infrastructures. 121
Multinational corporations 122 and corporate
philanthropies 123 became increasingly attentive and responsive to the
HIV/AIDS global crises. Of particular note, after previously making
grants of $1.5 million and $25 million for global HIV/AIDS initiatives,
in January 2001, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation committed a
multi-year $100 million challenge grant to the International AIDS
Vaccine Initiative, a global nonprofit organization aimed at speeding
124
the development and distribution of an AIDS vaccine.
The year 2001 brought further significant changes. African
leaders broke their former silence and called on the United States to
assist in the global HIV/AIDS crisis. 125 The U.N. launched a new
effort to focus international attention and resources on the global
AIDS pandemic. 126 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan publicly
outlined objectives for combating HIV/AIDS and called for leadership,
resources, and openness to fight HIV/AIDS. 127 He proposed the
creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
(Global Fund), 128 an independent organization formed with the
endorsement of the U.N. and leaders of the G8 and African countries
to attract and disburse funds to prevent and treat AIDS, tuberculosis,

Leadership Role in Providing Direction and Funding and to Build New Alliances, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at AS.
121.
See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 60, at i-ii, 9, 12, 17, 21, 22;
SCHNEIDER & MOODIE, supra note 2, at 1, 3-12; Applegarth, supra note 71, at 26.
122.
See, e.g., Editorial, Africa AIDS Funding Imperative, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2000, at B6 (discussing the World Bank's efforts to stop the spread of AIDS). The
economic consequences motivated multinational corporations (and corporate
philanthropies) involvement because infection of their work force with HIV/AIDS
affected their bottom line. See, e.g., THE JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON
HIV/AIDS ET AL., THE BUSINESS RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS: IMPACT AND LESSONS
LEARNED 19-39 (2000).
123.
See, e.g., FUNDERS CONCERNED ABOUT AIDS, REPORT ON HIV/AIDS
GRANTMAKING BY U.S. PHILANTHROPY 3-14 (Nov. 2003); FUNDERS CONCERNED ABOUT
AIDS, VOICES FROM THE FIELD: REMOBILIZING HIV/ADS PHILANTHROPY FOR THE 21st
CENTURY 10, 12 (2001) [hereinafter VOICES FROM THE FIELD]; Karen DeYoung, AIDS
Warriors; Carter, Gates Sr. Find Hell and Hope in a Continent's Plague, WASH. POST,
Apr. 14, 2002, at F1; Editorial, A Global Cause, WASH. POST, May 6, 2001, at B6.
124.
VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 123, at 12.
125.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 206. Apparently P.W. Botha, former Prime
Minister of South Africa from 1978 to 1984 and subsequently State President of South
Africa from 1984 to 1989, a staunch supporter of apartheid, saw no benefit to himself in
publicly revealing the HIV/AIDS problem in his country. It was not until the first black
Africans, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, became the first two democratically
elected Presidents of the Republic of South Africa that the silence on their country's
HIV/AIDS epidemic was broken. See id. at 199-206.
126.
See VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note 123, at 12.
127.
See id.; BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 251.
128.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 251; VOICES FROM THE FIELD, supra note
123, at 12.
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and malaria. 1 29 Secretary General Annan obtained initial financial
States and others totaling
support commitments from the United
30
between $7 billion and $10 billion.'
In 2002, then-former President Clinton publicly declared
HIV/AIDS to be a humanitarian issue, and regretting that he had not
furthered the cause more by making it a domestic and foreign policy
priority during his presidency, he announced global HIV/AIDS as one
of his post-presidential main concerns.1 31 He perceived the HIV/AIDS
cause as a means for the United States to become involved in helping
the global community, leading him to propose a plan for developing
nations to contribute sufficient funds to support the costs of
13 2
HIV/AIDS drugs, care, and needed resources.
As time progressed, more reports relayed the enormous impact of
HIV/AIDS. Worldwide the number of individuals living with
HIV/AIDS continued to rise in every region.13 3 Through the new
millennium, Sub-Saharan Africa remained the area most affectednearly two-thirds of all of the world's infected people reside in SubSaharan Africa, and 76% of all HIV-infected women live there.' 3 4 But
at the same time, steep increases in individuals living with HIV/AIDS
13 5
occurred in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Eastern Asia.
Regardless of the region, infections and deaths increased among
gay men, heterosexual married couples, and women, 136 leaving
unprecedented numbers of orphaned children. 137 HIV/AIDS had

See TODD SUMMERS, THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TB, AND MALARIA
129.
1-9 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2002); The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, A Partnership to Prevent and Treat AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria 1 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org.
130.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 250-51. President George W. Bush pledged
$200 million to the Global Fund. Id. at 258. Bill Gates pledged $100 million to the
Global Fund. Id. at 259. The G8 countries pledged financial support to the Global
Fund, but did not provide the funding until after the end of 2001. See id. at 259-60.
131.
Id. at 224. When Bill Clinton was President, he failed to follow through
immediately despite the advice of his Secretary of Health and Human Resources,
Donna Shalala, to increase funding for the global AIDS cause. See id. at 214, 218.
Finally, in 2000, President Clinton saw that U.S. funding for AIDS increased, but only
by a fraction of the amount considered necessary by the State Department Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs. See id. at 169, 212.
132.
Id. at 224.
UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14, at 2.
133.
See id.
134.
See id.
135.
Globally, an increasing proportion of HIV/AIDS infected individuals are
136.
female; nearly 50% of all people living with HIV/AIDS are female. See id. at 4. Over
one-half (57%) of all individuals infected with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa are
women. See id.
137.
See id. An estimated 15 million children worldwide have been orphaned as
a result of one or both parents' dying of AIDS, and as of 2003, about 12.1 million of
these orphaned children (children under the age of 17) lived in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Press Release, Charles F. MacCormack, World AIDS Day 2005-Behind the Numbers,
AIDS Has a Child's Face (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.savethechildren.org/health/
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become a cause celebre of various interest groups. The same
conservatives that once called HIV/AIDS the punishment for sinning
against God were now saying it was a moral imperative to get
involved and help the people dying of HIV/AIDS. 138 This conservative
religious interest group had changed its tune, and it had the ear of
President George W. Bush. 139 President Bush began to publicly talk
of funding the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa. 140 This was a way
for President Bush to placate his conservative base and to show the
world the good citizenry of the United States. In other words, the
United States had used up much of its political capital by going to
war in Iraq, and taking the lead in committing funding to combat
HIV/AIDS in Africa was a way for the United States to be seen in a
different light. Also, a growing groundswell of diverse and influential
individuals and government officials pressed President Bush to make
global HIV/AIDS a "flagship issue" and to increase the U.S. financial
support for the Global Fund. 14 1 Nonetheless, with Iraq on President
Bush's front burner, he had a difficult time making the HIV/AIDS
cause a policy priority.
After the United States had been fully entrenched in Iraq for
over a year, President Bush began to focus more attention on
HIV/AIDS. At a time when the disease domestically was more under
control, he declared intentions to increase governmental funds for
fighting the disease abroad. 14 2 At his State of the Union Address on

=
hivaids/ceostatement.asp?stationpub=i -hpln s44&ArticlelD=&NewsID . Millions of
by the disease
been
otherwise
impacted
children worldwide live with HIV/AIDS or have
through the loss of one or more parents. See Avert.org, HIV, AIDS and Children,
http://www.avert.org/children.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006). Save the Children, USA
estimates that approximately 25 million children will be orphaned by 2010 from
parents dying from AIDS. MacCormack, supra. There are worldwide social, economic,
and political problems that result from the large numbers of orphaned children.
138.
See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Pushes AIDS Plan Criticized by Some
Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2003, at A22; Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush to Back Bill
on AIDS and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A24; Elisabeth Bumiller,
Evangelicals Sway White House on Human Rights Issues Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2003, at 1.1.
139.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 250-51.
See, e.g., Geoff Dyer, Bush to Focus on Tackling AIDS Crisis in Africa, FIN.
140.
TIMES (London), May 30, 2003, at 10; Amy Goldstein & Dan Morgan, Bush Signs $15
Billion AIDS Bill; Funding Questioned, WASH. POST, May 28, 2003, at A2; Dana
Milbank, Bush to Congress: Fund AIDS Fight; President Vows to Work for Peace in
Africa, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at A18.
141.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 262-77, 287-95, 299. Among those
pressuring President Bush were AIDS activists, faith-based community leader Billy
Graham, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Health and Human Resources
Tommy Thompson, Bill Gates, Bono (Paul Hewson), Jesse Helms, Bill Frist, and U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan. Id.
See Fact Sheet: The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS, http://www.
142.
(last visited Sept. 3,
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030129-1.html
2006) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (discussing President Bush's initiative to increase
commitment to international AIDS assistance).
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January 28, 2003, President Bush acknowledged the vital importance
to the United States of saving millions abroad from decimation by
HIV/AIDS. 143 He announced the President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief Program (PEPFAR) directed at fifteen focus countries
where half of the world's HIV/AIDS victims live. 144 He requested
Congress to commit $15 billion in funds for disease prevention and
care and treatment of HIV/AIDS victims over five years. 14 5 Almost
one-tenth of all PEPFAR funding was marked specifically for Africa
146
for expenditure on children whose parents were HIV/AIDS victims.
It was reported that in its first eight months, PEPFAR supported
treatment for approximately 155,000 HIV-infected children and
adults in the target countries. 147 It also has been reported that,
unfortunately, a large portion of the U.S. aid never actually reaches
the identified beneficiaries. 148 Nonetheless, U.S. funding for
HIV/AIDS appears to have gained a place on the U.S. global policy
agenda. For fiscal year 2006, President Bush asked Congress for $3.2
billion for international HIV programs, but Congress reduced that
amount to less than $2 billion. 149 For fiscal year 2007, President Bush
requested a $2.89 billion appropriation for global HIV/AIDS. 150 Most
of this governmental money is to be channeled through the U.S.
15 1
Agency for International Development (USAID).

143.

Id.

144.
Id.
145.
Id. The goals of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Program
(PEPFAR) were: (1) prevent 7 million new infections in the target countries; (2) treat 2
million HIV/AIDS victims; and (3) care for 10 million HIV-infected individuals and
AIDS orphans. Id.
This amount included $10 billion in new money to fight AIDS in twelve African
countries, two Caribbean countries, and one Asian country, of which $1 billion was to
go to the Global Fund and the remaining $9 billion was to be directed by the United
States in a bilateral capacity. See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 310. Overall, 80% of the
new bilateral assistance is for AIDS treatment and care, with the remaining 20%
directed toward AIDS prevention. Of the latter amount, one-third must be used for
"abstinence until marriage programs." See POPULATION ACTION INT'L, WHAT YOU NEED
TO

KNOW ABOUT THE GLOBAL GAG

RULE AND

U.S. HIV/AIDS ASSISTANCE:

AN

UNOFFICIAL GUIDE 3, available at http://www.populationaction.org/resources/
publications/globalgagrule/GagRule-download.htm.
146.
See Fact Sheet, supra note 142.
147.
Testimony on the President's FY 2006 Budget Request for the Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations (Apr. 13,
2005) (testimony by Ambassador Randall L. Tobias), available at http://www.state.gov
s/gac/rIrm/44619.htm.
148.
See Helen Epstein, The Lost Children of AIDS, 52 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 3,
2005, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18399 (stating, among other
criticisms, that 60% of U.S. foreign aid funding stays in the US).
149.
See Guy Dinmore, AID OrganisationsHit Out at Bush Budget, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 6, 2006, at 1, available at http://news.ft.com/cms/s/6a472e32-9761-llda82b7-0000779e2340.html.
150.
Id.
151.
Michael M. Phillips, Bush Ties Money for AIDS Work To a Policy Pledge,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2005, at A3. President Bush's request for domestic HIV/AIDS
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Critics have pointed out that the government's support for
fighting HIV/AIDS has been diluted by other health policies of
President Bush. 152 Perhaps foremost was President Bush's
reinstatement of the global gag rule on his inaugural day in office in
January 2001.153 The global gag rule prevents the principal bilateral
conduit of U.S. funding, USAID, from financially supporting foreign
NGOs that use their own funds to provide abortion services,
counseling, referrals, and information about abortion, whether safe or
unsafe, and to participate in legislative or grassroots lobbying on
these topics. 154 In 2003, President Bush broadened the global gag rule
to cover funding received by foreign NGOs from the U.S. Department
of State. 155 President Bush also supported three conservative
legislative amendments to PEPFAR that have damaged financial
support for HIV/AIDS. 156 Under an amendment introduced by
Congressman Joe Pitts, 33% of the PEPFAR funding available for
prevention programs and services must be earmarked for "abstinence
until marriage" programs. 157 This amendment reduces potential
allocations of funds for programs in underdeveloped countries that
would inform about the benefits of utilizing condoms to prevent
HIV/AIDS and that might otherwise help politically marginalized
females subjected to males' sexual and societal dominance. 158 The

funding was significantly greater than for international funding of HLV/AIDS. See
GlobalHealthReporting.Org, supra note 63 (reporting that President Bush requested
$21 billion in combined domestic and global funding of HIV/AIDS for fiscal year 2006,
of which $3 billion was for use in low and middle income countries).
152.
See, e.g., Alan Ingram, Global Leadership and Global Health: Contending
Meta-narratives,Divergent Responses, Fatal Consequences, 19 INT'L REL. 381, 390-92
(2005) (discussing the "unilateral orientation" of the Bush administration regarding
global health initiatives).
153.
See GEORGE W. BUSH, MEMORANDUM ON RESTORATION OF THE MEXICO CITY
POLICY (Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
20010123-5.html. President Reagan had unveiled the global gag rule policy in 1984.
President Clinton rescinded the policy on his first day in office, but seven years later,
Congress statutorily revived the policy as a condition to an appropriation act for fiscal
year 2000. President George W. Bush reinstated it on his first day in office. Id.
154.
See id. (stating that nongovernmental organizations may not receive
federal funds if they promote abortion).
155.
See Edwin Chen, Bush Further Limits Funds for Groups Counseling
Abortion, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at A3 (stating that President Bush expanded the
global gag rule to "all other family-planning grants funneled through the State
Department").
156.
E.g., United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (2003). See INT'L WOMEN'S
HEALTH COAL., IDEOLOGY OVER PREVENTION: THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC AND
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 1 (2004), available at http://www.iwhc.org/global/uspolicy/
hivaids [hereinafter THE IDEOLOGY] (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
157.
THE IDEOLOGY, supra note 156. Only 20% of the PEPFAR funding is
available for HIV/AIDS prevention services. See supra note 145. Thus, approximately
6.6% of PEPFAR funds must be earmarked for programs that promote abstinence until
marriage.
158.
See 117 Stat. 711; THE IDEOLOGY, supra note 156.
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"Smith Conscience Amendment" permits U.S. funded faith based
organizations to refrain from providing information on condoms, even
though condoms have been proved effective against contracting
HIV/AIDS. 159 The third amendment requires NGOs that receive
PEPFAR funds to certify their opposition to prostitution, sex
trafficking, and the legalization of prostitution. 160 Although recently
held unconstitutional by two federal district courts as applied to two
domestic NGOs, 161 this amendment has undercut HIV/AIDS
treatment and prevention efforts for sex workers. 16 2 Reports indicate
that these legislative actions have resulted in reduced distributions of
condoms and other contraceptive supplies, lessened spending on
programs to prevent HTV/AIDS transmission, heightened allocations
of AIDS relief funding to faith based organizations that traditionally
support abstinence-only means of HIV/AIDS prevention and
protection, and eliminated funding to international family planning
programs that provide legal abortions or abortion counseling in
addition to HIV/AIDS prevention programs. 16 3 These actions have
undermined attempts to restrict the spread of the HTV/AIDS
pandemic. 164 Thus, there is abundant cynicism with respect to, and
criticism of, President Bush's motives and means of implementing his
165
chosen global HIV/AIDS policy.

159.
THE IDEOLOGY, supra note 156.
160.
22 U.S.C. § 7631(0 (2006).
161.
Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 430
F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); DKT Int'l v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 435
F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2006).
162.
THE IDEOLOGY, supra note 156.
163.
See, e.g., ACCESS DENIED: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON INT'L FAMILY PLANNING, THE
IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL GAG RULE IN KENYA (2006), available at http://www.global
gagrule.org/pdfs/case studies/GGRcase kenya 2006.pdf; GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
SPENDING REQUIREMENT PRESENTS CHALLENGES FOR ALLOCATING PREVENTION FUNDING

UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF, GAO 06-395 (Apr. 2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d06395.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT];
POPULATION ACTION INT'L, supra note 145; Susan A. Cohen, Global Gag Rule:
Exporting Antiabortion Ideology at the Expense of American Values, GurrTMACHER REP.
ON PUB. POLV 1-3 (June 2001), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/04/3/
gr040301.html; Susan A. Cohen, U.S. Global AIDS Policy and Sexually Active Youth: A
High-Risk Strategy, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 4-6 (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/ gr080304.html; Celia W. Dugger, U.S. Focus
on Abstinence Weakens AIDS Fight, Agency Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at A9;
Ingram, supra note 152, at 391; Jamison, supra note 70, at 14.
164.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 163.
165.
See, e.g., id.; BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 310 (implying that political
motivations of President Bush resulted in only one-tenth of the U.S. funding for
combating global HIV/AIDS would go to the Global Fund); Dyer, supra note 140, at 10
(stating that the AIDS initiative is a "useful protection against criticism of the war in
Iraq, other U.S. foreign aid policies or its position on issues such as global warming");
Epstein, supra note 148 (suggesting that PEPFAR is problematic in its execution);
James K. Glassman, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, TECHCENTRALSTATION, July 13,
2004 (criticizing and contrasting the U.S. position under PEPFAR that makes
unavailable to needy countries HIV/AIDS drugs not approved by the U.S. Food and
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Summary

In sum, as activist nonprofits and the media raised public
awareness and private grantors funded HIV/AIDS initiatives, the
U.S. government finally became mobilized to financially support the
global fight against HIV/AIDS. Various initiatives and innovative
partnerships formed and were funded. 166 More corporate and family
private foundations shifted commitments to health in their
international giving priorities. 16 7 In large part, the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation 168 deserves credit not only for its tremendous
contributions to projects for the prevention, treatment, and research

Drug Administration with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, which will supply HIV/ADS
drugs manufactured in India that have been pre-qualified as safe and effective by the
World Health Organization); Phillips, supra note 151, at A3 (reporting that the Bush
administration had attached moral strings to U.S. financial assistance to domestic
HIV/AIDS nonprofit organizations that provide overseas healthcare services);
Editorial, Preserving the Global AIDS Fund, 52 N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at A26
(suggesting that President Bush's PEPFAR program is riddled with problems
connected with business and political agendas and lauding the value of the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria). But see Mark Ottenweller & Marion
Bunch, The Lost Children of AIDS: An Exchange, 52 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 15, 2005,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18568 (responding to Epstein, supra note
148, which includes some factually incorrect conclusions).
166.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Thus far, the most successful
effort to fight HIV/AIDS has been the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's partnership
with the government of Botswana. The Foundation and the Botswana government
have worked together to make a viable paradigm to treat HIV/AIDS and have had
more success then anyone else. See Global Health - Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/GlobalHealth (last visited Sept. 3, 2006). For a
discussion of public and private investment in AIDS prevention, treatment, and
research and of public-private partnerships, see, for example, PRIYA ALAGIRI ET AL.,
GLOBAL SPENDING ON HIV/AIDS: TRACKING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN
AIDS PREVENTION, CARE, AND RESEARCH 2-10 (July 2001); CORPORATE UPDATE, supra

note 71, at 3-12; Peter A. Clark & Kevin O'Brien, Fighting AIDS in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Is a Public-Private Partnership a Viable Paradigm?, 9 MED. SCI. MONITOR
ET28, ET28-31, ET34 (2003).
167.
Between 1998 and 2002, health's share of funding rose from one-seventh of
all international funding by corporations and private foundations to nearly one-third,
far out-distancing other funding areas. See LOREN RENZ, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
GRANTMAKING III: AN UPDATE ON U.S. FOUNDATION TRENDS 54 (2004).

168.
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation) provided more
than $472 million for international health initiatives, including $112.2 million for
HIV/AIDS, schistosomaiasis, and other diseases. Id. at 61. Additionally, the Gates
Foundation made available $72.4 million for research on HIV/AIDS and parasitic and
tropical diseases. Id. In 2004 and 2005, for all global health programs the Gates
Foundation grants exceeded $4.1 billion, and for HIV, tuberculosis, and reproductive
health initiatives, its grants exceeded $1.4 billion. See Global Health - Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, supra note 166.
By contrast, the second largest funder of H1V/AIDS was the Rockefeller
Foundation, which provided grants totaling $7 million for HIV/AIDS and other
diseases. LOREN RENZ, ET AL., supra note 167, at 62. Other large funders of HIV/AIDS
initiatives included Bristol Meyers Squibb, Carnegie, Doris Duke, Robert Wood
Johnson, Merck Company, and Starr foundations. Id.
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of HIV/AIDS (and other epidemics), 169 but also for spurring other
funders. Indeed, between 1998 and 2002 financial support for disease
prevention and treatment, the second largest health recipient
category, 170 grew more than ten-fold to almost $161 million, of which
171
more than $71 million was directed overseas.
Despite the raised profile of HIV/AIDS in the late 1990s and the
new millennium, the increased financial support, and the flurry of
activity, the harsh reality is that the United States (and the world)
missed many vital opportunities and years for developing foreign
health policies that would help to contain the HIV/AIDS virus and
avoid the multitude of global crises produced by proliferation of the
disease. For nearly two decades, the president and other official
policymakers were not receptive to messages of activist nonprofit
organizations or the handful of established private foundations
172
concerned about HIV/AIDS. Presidents' disregard and inaction
permitted HIV/AIDS to become a global pandemic of epic proportion,
one that to date the global community has been unable to effectively
control. Such a tragedy should not be permitted to be repeated as
other threats to the health of politically marginalized people around
the globe arise. This Article suggests that restructuring the
presidential foreign health policymaking system can help avert other
such tragic outcomes.

III.

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE-THE ACTORS

The making of foreign policy has always been a dynamic and
complex process impacted by many events and actors. Scholars
suggest that modern U.S. foreign policy can be divided into
distinguishable time periods identified by historical motivating forces
such as the Cold War and the war against terrorism. 173 They also

169.
See id. at 54. Other named epidemics include tuberculosis and malaria. Id.
170.
Public health was the largest funding recipient category in the health field.
See id. at 60.
171.
See id. at 61.
172.
Perhaps there was also dangerous symbolic response by President Reagan.
For a brief discussion, see supra note 96.
173.
The first recent period of foreign policymaking spans the Cold War. During
that time, U.S. foreign relations and U.S. foreign policymaking were organized around,
and reactive to, the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the
mid-1990s, the United States entered a period that has been labeled a "holiday from
history." See CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AN AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY FOR A UNIPOLAR WORLD 17 (2004), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/

20040227_book755text.pdf (suggesting that it felt like a period of peace, but was an
"interval of dreaming between two periods of reality"); Charles Krauthammer, History
Will Not be Kind to Clinton, TOWNHALL.COM, June 29, 2004, http://frontpagemag.com/
Articles/Printable.asp?ID=14001 (describing it as "our retreat from seriousness, our Seinfeld
decade of obsessive ordinariness"); see also Owen Harries, America's New Game Plan for
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indicate that U.S. foreign policy in part has stemmed from
policymakers' reactive or proactive behavior to these events. 174 How
some of those actors should participate in the future is at the heart of
this Article.
The many actors involved in the U.S. foreign policymaking
processes can be categorized as those having and those not having
formal participatory authority. The U.S. Constitution confers on
Congress and the president shared powers 175 over foreign affairs.

DominationRests on Success in Iraq, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 21, 2003, availableat
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5269.htm;
Charles Krauthammer, The
Real New World Order, JEWISH WORLD REV., Nov. 7, 2001, availableat http://www.jewish
worldreview.com/llOl/world.order.asp. In contrast to many other times in the history of
the United States, there was no perceived immediate foreign threat around which to
organize foreign policy; it was a time of relative peace. Government policymakers
considered the United States to be in a unique position as the world's only superpower,
and they viewed that status as a means for fostering a better world. As a result of this
perspective, these government officials proactively asserted broader principles around
which they were interested in building coherent foreign policy to shape future relations
of the United States to the world. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 18. The formulation
of foreign policy revolved not around what was actually occurring, but rather upon
concepts, values, and ideals for promoting domestic interests by improving the world
for humankind. See Michael Mandelbaum, ForeignPolicy as Social Work, 75 FOREIGN
AFF. 16 (1996). The third, and current, period in foreign policymaking is postSeptember 11, 2001. The events of September 11 immediately became the galvanizing
forces around which to organize foreign policymaking. As a result of the global threat
from terrorism, national security once again became the motivating force behind, and
the organizing principle in, the creation and implementation of U.S. foreign relations
and foreign policymaking. It is during this period that HIV/AIDS was firmly placed on
the U.S. foreign policy agenda because government officials had come to perceive it as a
threat to national security interests. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
174.
James M. Scott & A. Lane Crothers, Out of the Cold: The Post-Cold War
Context of U.S. Foreign Policy, in AFTER THE END: MAKING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
POST-COLD WAR WORLD 1, 2 (James M. Scott ed., 1998) [hereinafter AFTER THE END].
175.
For example, pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution and the gloss of
history, the president assumes expansive roles as commander in chief, chief diplomat,
and chief of state, all of which enable him to make a great deal of foreign policy
constitutionally. Legislation also has contributed to presidential power in making
foreign policy. For a brief discussion of examples of presidential power exercised under
congressionally ratified legislation, see infra note 178.
Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants members of Congress authority with
respect to foreign affairs to provide for "the common Defence"; to regulate foreign
commerce; to punish certain crimes committed on the high seas and offenses against
"the law of Nations"; to declare war; to make rules of war; and to raise, support and
regulate an army and navy. The Senate and the president share the power to make
treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
While Congress and the president share powers, some presidential powers, such as
the power to negotiate on behalf of the United States--cannot be exercised by
Congress. James M. Lindsay, From Deference to Activism and Back Again: Congress
and the Politics of American Foreign Policy, in THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE 183, 185 (Eugene Wittkopf & James M.
McCormick eds., 2004). Likewise, some congressional powers, such as the powers to
appropriate funds, declare war and raise and equip the military, and control trade, do
not reside in the president. Because Congress holds authority to authorize and
appropriate funds, its judicious use of those rights can make it a powerful foreign
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Nonetheless, in modern times, 176 particularly since the presidency of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the president has been, and may well
178
17 7
continue to be, the "imperial" or dominant foreign policymaker.

policymaking body. See Lindsay, supra, at 184; C. PETER MAGRATH ET AL., THE
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 638-39 (1973); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER
AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO
REAGAN 29 (1990). Six of the eighteen Constitutional powers delegated to Congress
relate to foreign affairs. ALTERMAN, supra note 37, at 150. Over half of the thirty-six

standing congressional committees are concerned with foreign policy. See MAGRATH,
supra, at 639.
Congress and the president theoretically could be equally powerful constructive
partners in directing foreign affairs. See id. at 637. Congress could control foreign
policy through its appropriation powers. See id. Nonetheless, the formal structure
creates tensions and consequently engenders opportunities for the president and
Congress to fight for the privilege of guiding foreign policy. See Introduction: The
Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, in THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE, supra, at 1, 10 [hereinafter Introduction];
HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 6. Thus, since the birth of the United States, the relative
power of Congress and the president in the foreign policy realm has fluctuated. History
has demonstrated that the structure also creates possibilities that, at any given time,
only one of these institutional parties will take an activist position while the other
remains relatively passive or deferential. See Lindsay, supra, at 184. On a practical
level, there are numerous factors that affect the degree to which it is the president or
Congress that drives the development of foreign policy at any specific time. Among
them are the personality and experience of presidents and their executive branch
advisors; the level of involvement or lack of engagement of the United States in war or
other national crisis; the relationship of Congress and the president; the fragmentation
and decentralization of Congress, diplomatic interests, partisanship and other political
pressures; and economic forces. See TERRY L. DEIBEL, CLINTON AND CONGRESS: THE
POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY 7 (2000); KAY SCHLOZMAN & JOHN TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 324 (1986).

176.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., involving a presidential arms
embargo proclamation in 1934, the Supreme Court acknowledged the president's broad
powers to conduct foreign affairs. The unanimous opinion of the court, authored by
Justice Sutherland, proclaimed: "[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen
as a representative of the nation .... As Marshall said in his great argument of March
7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, 'The President is the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."' United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
177.
See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
178.
See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 6; Lindsay, supra note 175, at 187-190;
Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90
IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005).

Where national security is considered at stake, the president's power over foreign
affairs has been interpreted especially expansively., For example, in 1917, Congress
enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), which conferred broad discretionary
powers to the president in times of war to restrict or prohibit certain transactions
considered potentially threatening to the United States. See Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106,
40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2003)). To remedy
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's invocation of TWEA to declare a bank holiday in
response to a run on bank funds after the beginning of the Great Depression, Congress
extended the discretionary powers of the president to include the ability to impose
economic sanctions during times of peace if the president declared a national
emergency. Act of March 9, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-1, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1 (1933) (codified
as amended at 50 US.C. app. § 5(b) (2003)). Later, when Congress enacted the
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Executive branch agencies, some created in part to provide counsel to
policy decisionmakers and to execute policy decisions, 179 also can be
important institutional actors in the foreign policymaking system.
80
Since the Vietnam War, an increasing multitude of individuals,

International Emergency and Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), it modified the
president's peacetime economic sanction statutory authority. Trading With the Enemy
Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2003)). Section 1701(a) of IEEPA permits the president to
impose sanctions under § 1702 "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President
declares a national emergency with respect to such threat." 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2003).
Acting under this presidential power, President Carter issued an executive order in
November 1979, freezing Iranian government assets in response to Iranians' seizure of
the American Embassy in Tehran. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov.
14, 1979). Authority to seize assets and to detain individuals was expanded by the U.S.
Patriot Act, passed in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. I, § 106, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
For further discussion, see Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the
Financingof Terrorism and Its Implicationsfor Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations,
and Global Philanthropy,45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1355-60 (2004).
Nonetheless, presidential powers, even when attributed to national security
matters, are not without curbs. One such instance was the Supreme Court's restraint
on President Truman, who issued an executive order for the seizure of the country's
steel mills when he perceived an impending steel worker's strike to endanger national
security. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3,139 (Apr. 8, 1952). The steel
companies filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of Commerce, who was responsible
under President Truman's executive order for the seizure. The case ended up before the
Supreme Court. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Writing
for the majority, Justice Black found no constitutional power as Commander in Chief,
nor any statutory power, express or implied, for the President's seizure of the steel
mills. Id. at 584-85. Justice Frankfurter, writing a concurring opinion, noted that as a
result of Congress' express refusal to authorize the President's seizure of the steel
mills, the President did not have seizure authority under the U.S. Constitution, prior
seizure precedent notwithstanding. Id. at 593-615.
More recently, in the name of national security interests after September 11, 2001,
President George W. Bush has purportedly acted under his constitutional powers and
has been challenged for overreaching exuberance. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 536 (2004), Justice O'Connor, writing the majority opinion, expressed that
the president's war powers are not a "blank check." For media reports on President
George W. Bush's expansive view of his presidential powers, see infra note 184.
179.
Examples include the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland
Security, and Health and Human Services (H.H.S.), and the Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.). See Scott & Crothers, supra note 174, at 1, 9. H.H.S. in part fulfills its
charge for "protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human
services" by providing, through its C.D.C., "a system of health surveillance to monitor
and prevent disease outbreaks ...,[to] implement disease prevention strategies," and
to "guard against international disease transmission." H.H.S., What We Do,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
180.
Foreign heads of state and international organizations often approach the
president, executive branch bureaucrats, and members of Congress. See HAMILTON,
supra note 3, at 23-26.
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private sector businesses, 8 1 and nonprofits, all of which have no
prescribed legal authority or other official position in the foreign
policymaking apparatus, have actively vied to influence foreign
policymaking. 182 As a result of this mixture, "foreign policy may
emerge from shifting and uncertain interactions between the White
agencies, and groups and individuals
House, Congress, bureaucratic
18 3
from the private sector.'
A. The Presidentas the PrimaryForeign Policymaker
The president's expansive visions of executive power 184 and a
congressional ceding of its de facto constitutional powers over foreign
policy during the first decade of the Cold War era and the current
post-September 11th period1 5 have enabled presidential dominance
over the selection of U.S. foreign policy priorities and the formulation

For-profit businesses with interests in trade and economic matters have
181.
been significant actors. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Garten, Business and Foreign Policy, 76
FOREIGN AFF. 67 (1997) (commenting on the role of business as a foreign policy player).
Additionally, the mass media plays a role unlike other outside forces. Through its
coverage choices with respect to foreign affairs matters, the media can target topics,
create or stimulate public debate, be a source of information or misinformation, and
present policy options for public consideration. See Introduction, supra note 175, at 8.
See infra note 209 and accompanying text (regarding the modest influence
182.
of nonprofits on the president's foreign policymaking).
183.
Scott & Crothers, supra note 174, at 8. What some considered a relatively
straightforward foreign policymaking environment before the Cold War has evolved in
this time of globalization into a far more complex system. See id. at 7-8 (describing the
policymaking environment as a shifting constellation); James M. Scott, Interbranch
Policy Making after the End, in AFTER THE END, supra note 174, at 389, 404-405
(suggesting factors that impact the shifts in the policymaking constellation).
Immigration and globalization have inextricably connected domestic and foreign policy
concerns, which add to the complexities of the foreign policymaking system. See, e.g.,
HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 16 (commenting on the linkage of the U.S. economy to the
global economy and on various concerns that have added complexity); Wright & Fiore,
supra note 120, at A8 (quoting President Clinton as stating that there is "no longer a
clear, bright line dividing America's domestic concerns and America's foreign policy
concerns"); John W. Dietrich, Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the
China MFN Debates, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 280 (1999).
184.
President Reagan and, more recently, President George W. Bush have been
accused of rather grandiose visions of executive power. See e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, For
President, Final Say on a Bill Sometimes Comes After the Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2006, at All; Cornelia Dean, At a Scientific Gathering, U.S. Policies Are Lamented,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at 1.28; Noah Feldman, Who Can Check the President?,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 52; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, More Attacks and Meetings
on a Program Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at A8; Adam Liptak, A Quick
Focus on the Powers of a President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at Al; Adam Liptak,
Court in Transition: The Legal Context, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at All. For further
discussion on legislative and executive branch expansions of presidential power over
foreign affairs, see supra note 178.
185.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.

1084

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39.1053

of policy approaches. 186 Disconcertingly, limited transparency and
public accountability of the president's official advisory structure
have contributed to heightening the president's foreign policy powers.
They may also effectively have prevented placement of global health
matters on the president's foreign policy agenda. Elite presidential
advisors and powerful confidants who have their own foreign policy
agendas and biases may create an insular policymaking environment
for the president. Because a president's direct contacts with
nongovernmental foreign policy actors-individuals, businesses,
nonprofit interest groups, and organizations-are initiated by the
White House, it is possible for such gatekeepers to shield a president
from them, particularly if their concerns are perceived as inconsistent
18 7
with, or beyond the scope of, U.S. national interest.
The history of the HIV/AIDS crisis is a testament to the
insularity of presidents and the lack of transparency and public
accountability of their foreign policymaking system. 188 Four
presidents-Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and
during his first term, George W. Bush 189 -largely
ignored, or
affirmatively rejected, 190 the need to attend to the HIV/AIDS
pandemic and the worldwide humanitarian, health, economic,

186.
See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 9, 15, 42, 44; Jerel Rosati & Stephen
Twing, The Presidencyand U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War, in AFTER THE END,
supra note 174, at 28, 35; MAGRATH, supra note 175, at 637 (commenting on the
relative powers of Congress and the president during the Cold War period). As typical
in wartime, during approximately the first decade of the Cold War ending with the
Vietnam War and during the post-September 11 period, Congress as an institution
essentially ceded its de facto constitutional powers, or at least deferred to, the
president in foreign policy matters. ALTERMAN, supra note 37, at 150; HAMILTON, supra
note 3, at 7-9, 42; Lindsay, supra note 175, at 187-90. Between 1985 and 1998, it had
not passed a foreign aid authorization bill, which is its primary mechanism for making
foreign policy. ALTERMAN, supra note 37, at 150; HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 7-9, 42;
Lindsay, supra note 175, at 187-90. For further discussion on presidents' expansive
views of executive power, see supra note 175.
187.
See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 175; ALEXANDER L. GEORGE,
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF
INFORMATION AND ADVICE 121-136 (1980).
188.
See supra Part II.
189.
President George W. Bush appears to be more concerned with the African
problems, including AIDS, than his predecessors.
190.
As one author has stated:
The White House has "negative" power-the power to say no. While this does
not mean the president can determine foreign policy, it may mean that the
president has the ability to determine what will not be foreign policy. In this
sense, the other elements in the foreign policy arena have a difficult, if not
impossible, time making foreign policy without the White House.
Scott, supra note 174, at 395.
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political, and security crises it generated. 191 And their tragic inaction
occurred despite formal organizational structures that enable
presidents to receive from governmental advisors input on
192
noteworthy foreign issues.
B. Executive Branch Agencies
Executive branch agencies are "expected to be the government's
'eyes and ears,' searching for incipient global changes and assessing
American needs and interests abroad." 193 Leaders of such executive
agencies as the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland
Security, and Health and Human Services (H.H.S.), as well as the
Central Intelligence Agency are expected to provide expert and
194
impartial counsel to the president in shaping foreign policy.
Nonetheless, political and job-related pressures can affect the
impartiality, scope, and nature of the advice that these government
officials offer to a president for consideration in his foreign policy
deliberations. Without publicly transparent processes, these
governmental "eyes and ears" may fail to aggressively pursue matters
unpopular to a president or may spin information to fit a president's

191.
President George H.W. Bush has been widely considered a strong president
in the foreign policy arena. Rosati & Twing, supra note 186, at 34. Nonetheless, he lost
his bid for reelection in 1992.
192.
Formal organizational structures give the president access to advice on
foreign affairs from the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the National
Security Council, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as members
of the president's cabinet, including the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce,
Agriculture, and Treasury. See MAGRATH, supra note 175, at 633-34. The Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, who is often the most important policy advisor
to a president, is assisted by the National Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget,
and the Office of Science and Technology. See id. at 633. The National Security Council
is an "institutionalized" advisory group that acts like a "special foreign policy cabinet."
Id. Its members include the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning. See id.
For a discussion of the advisory role of the executive branch agencies, see infra
Part II.A.2.
193.
The Institutional Setting, in THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE, supra note 175, at 129, 137.
194.
See id. at 9; Christopher M. Jones, The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy in a
New Era, in AFTER THE END, supra, note 174, at 57, 57-84 (outlining the budget,
structure, and personnel of the foreign policy bureaucracy). It is not necessarily only an
agency's top officials that can influence the shape and character of foreign policy. As
policy prioritization and implementation responsibilities are delegated down an
agency's hierarchical ladder, sometimes even lower level staff members may have a
notable impact on foreign policy development. See Scott & Crothers, supra note 174, at
10-11 (arguing that some foreign policy is "conducted at mid- to lower-levels of the
executive branch").
Even if advisors from the executive branch agencies provide expert and impartial
counsel to a president, the advice may be ignored due to the president's own agenda or
personality. As state in footnote 54, supra, however, that factor is not the subject of
this Article.
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own foreign policy agenda, perhaps leaving little room to represent
those lurking dangers to U.S. interests precipitated by health
privations endured by politically marginalized minorities abroad.
These failures appear to have contributed to presidents' policy
inaction with respect to HIV/AIDS. Despite recognition in the early
1980s by the C.D.C., a division of H.H.S., 195 of HIV/AIDS as a
potential health threat of great magnitude domestically and
abroad, 196 the leaders of H.H.S. did not demonstrate much interest in
pushing the HIV/AIDS pandemic onto the presidents' foreign policy
screens. There were a few minor exceptions. For example, more than
a decade after HIV/AIDS was branded a potential public health
threat, President Clinton appointed Donna Shalala Secretary of
H.H.S. in 1993. Soon after her appointment, Ms. Shalala declared
AIDS as the number one disease priority, both domestically and
internationally. 197 During her six years as Secretary of H.H.S. she
directed the process to reform the welfare system, made health
insurance available to an estimated 3.3 million children through the
approval of all State Children's Health Insurance Programs, raised
child immunization rates to the highest levels in history, led major
reforms of the Federal Drug Administration's drug approval process
and food safety system, revitalized the National Institutes of Health,
198
and directed a major management and policy reform of Medicare.
Despite these accomplishments, she was unable to generate sufficient
interest to elevate AIDS to the president's domestic or foreign policy
realm.199

Another executive branch appointee of President Clinton,
Madeleine Albright, who assumed the position of Secretary of State in
1996, made some tentative efforts that year to raise public awareness
of the HIV/AIDS problem. In December 1996, she addressed the
World AIDS Day participants and thereafter commissioned a State
Department report on the pandemic. 200 But, if she made any
attempts in 1997 or 1998 to elevate HIV/AIDS as a possible
presidential foreign policy matter, she was unsuccessful. The State
Department's March 1999 issuance of its report, the "1999 U.S.
International Response to HIV/AIDS," did not place the global

195.
See supra note 179 (describing the mission of the C.D.C.).
196.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 5-16 (relating various meetings and
discussions among C.D.C. personnel about HIV/AIDS); supra note 173 and
accompanying text.
197.
BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 74.
198.
University of Miami, President Donna. E. Shalala's Biography, http://
www6.miami.edu/UMHICDAILJMHMain/l,1770,8548-1;8823-3,00.html (last visited Sept. 7,
2006).
199.
See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 74-76 (stating that the president would
never directly follow up on global AIDS and that for Ms. Shalala, "global AIDS was a
subaltern agenda item").
200.
Id. at 213.
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20 1
pandemic onto the list of the president's foreign policy priorities.
Nor did Mrs. Albright's subsequent address to the U.S.-Africa
Partnership Ministerial in Washington, D.C., indicate that she was
successful, when she stated that "[w]e need to focus urgently on the
devastating impact of HIV/AIDS, and make a commitment to address
'20 2
the disease as a national and international priority.
The failure to advance HIV/AIDS to a position on President
Clinton's foreign policy agenda may not be surprising. Although Ms.
Shalala served as President Clinton's main health counsel and Mrs.
Albright served as his principal foreign policy advisor, apparently
neither Secretary forcefully and continuously emphasized her
imperative conviction to forging solutions to the global HIV/AIDS
problems. 203 Many political scientists, moreover, characterize
President Clinton as a president who viewed "foreign policy as a
'distraction' from his domestic agenda and sought to delegate its
formulation to others whenever possible. ' 20 4 If President Clinton's
integral
senior
foreign
policy
expert
with
"unparalleled
responsibilities at the apex of the U.S. foreign policy-making
apparatus" 20 5 was not fully committed to combating global HIV/AIDS,
and his top H.H.S. official failed to vociferously and repeatedly push
for his attention to the disease, then inclusion of global HIV/AIDS on
President Clinton's foreign policy agenda had zero to slim chance.
Therefore, it appears that the government's "eyes and ears" are not
necessarily protectorates of significant U.S. interests in the
presidential foreign policymaking scheme.

201.
1999).

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1999 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS (March

202.
James Rubin, Spokesman, State Dep't, HIV/AIDS Report Released at Africa
Ministerial, (Mar. 16, 1999), http://www.aegis.com/news/usis/1999US990301.html.
203.

See BEHRMAN, supra note 28, at 214, 216 (noting that AIDS never "seemed

to incite Albright's energies" and describing Ms. Shalala as "relenting on pressing" the
matter of global AIDS).
204.
Thomas Preston & Margaret G. Hermann, Presidential Leadership Style
and the Foreign Policy Advisory Process, in THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE, supra note 175, at 363, 373.
205.
The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Foreign Policy-Making: An Interview with
Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 5 U.S. FOR. POL'Y
AGENDA 5, 5 (2000), availableat http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/03OO/ijpe/ pj5lpick.htm

(speaking generally of the importance of the Secretary of State in the U.S. foreign
policymaking structure).
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C. Nonprofits as NongovernmentalActors
Domestic nonprofit organizations and interest groups 20 6 have
exploded in number in recent years. 20 7 They have represented various
ethnic or religious constituencies, coalesced around specific causes,
sought to direct public opinion on foreign policy matters, financed
foreign policy studies, 208 and supported foreign policy initiatives.
Although some have marshaled considerable financial and electoral
forces, scholars have suggested that their activity levels must be
distinguished from, and are not the equivalent of, a power to truly
influence a president's actual formulation, selection, and adoption of
U.S. foreign policy. 20 9 Indeed their overall influence on the president's
foreign policymaking processes appears relatively minor. 210

206.
Interest groups are "organized associations that engage in activity relative
to government decisions." Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Groups, 4 HANDBOOK OF POL.
SCI. 175 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby, eds. 1975). The list is long and
includes ethnic groups, human rights groups, and environmental groups.
207.
See Dietrich, supra note 183, at 280 (there has been "a sharp increase in
the number of interest groups").
208.
Think tanks and private foundations have financed studies on various
aspects of foreign affairs. Id.
209.
These groups' influence on foreign policy can be handicapped by their lack
of direct access to the president and by narrow focuses not perceived as serving U.S.
interests in the broad international environment. See id. at 281 (describing interest
group influence on foreign policy as "slight" or "diffuse" because of its narrow focus and
small portion of the populace). But elite, established private foundations may have
greater access to a president. Historically, some of their leaders have rotated between
government and private foundations, effectively creating a "shadow cabinet world."
DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 377 (1973); see also BERMAN, supra
note 49, at 41-66, 127-59 (recounting the influence of the three large foundations on
policymaking and the movement of prominent individuals between important
governmental positions and leadership positions at private foundations).
Studies indicate that when public opinion has impacted presidents' foreign policy
decision-making, its strongest influence was on constraining the selection of a
particular policy option. DOUGLAS C. FOYLE, COUNTING THE PUBLIC IN: PRESIDENTS,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND FOREIGN POLICY 269 (Robert Y. Shapiro, ed., Columbia Univ.
Press 1999). Those presidents influenced by public opinion seemed to have been
concerned with the sufficiency of public support for the implementation of select foreign
policies and with sustaining an adequate electoral base. See id. at 19-20.
When Congress is instrumental in shaping foreign policy, these interest groups and
nonprofit organizations may have more influence. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE
NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS 1-33, 59-60 (1999) (detailing
the rise of citizen groups as the foundation for modern liberalism); Scholzman &
Tierney, supra note 175, at 324-26 (explaining the mutual political needs between the
President and organized interest groups); HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 25-26
(describing the collaboration between members of Congress and the leaders of top
officials of major international institutions); ROELOFS, supra note 49, at 3-5, 38-40,
52-53, 139-43, 157-206 (writing on the influence of private foundations on foreign
affairs); Samuel P. Huntington, The Erosion of American National Interests, in THE
DOMESTIC SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE, supra
note 175, at 55, 63 (commenting on the growing role of ethnic groups in shaping U.S.
foreign policy); Andrew Rich & R. Kent Weaver, Advocates and Analysts: Think Tanks
and the Politicizationof Expertise, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 3, at 235,
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IV. PRACTICAL REASONS FOR A FORMAL POLICYMAKING ROLE FOR
NONPROFITS

A. Nonprofit Organizationsas Unofficial Designers of Foreign Health

Policy
The modest influence of domestic nonprofits on presidential
foreign policymaking is not without some counterbalance. For many
years, domestic nonprofits privately, often quietly, and unofficially
have designed a substratum of foreign health policy through their
missions, economic support, and activities. 211 In efforts to contain
and eradicate infectious and other diseases that afflict adults and
children abroad, domestic private foundations and public charities

have created and implemented new prevention, treatment,
intervention, and relief programs. 212 They have financially supported
and provided family planning services, prenatal care, and
reproductive health initiatives worldwide. 213 These nonprofit

235-50 (describing various think tanks and concluding that they have become
"contentious advocates in balkanized debates over the direction of public policy"); Scott,
supra note 174, at 395-397 (remarking on the cross-pressures that the public creates
for congressional policymakers that constrain sustained and coherent foreign policy);
Eric M. Uslaner, All in the Family? Interest Groups and Foreign Policy, in INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS supra note 3, at 365-83 (describing the influence of interest groups,
and ethnic groups in particular, on foreign policy); The FP Interview, FOREIGN POL'Y
26, 38 (2001) (reporting that a top U.S. diplomat, Thomas Pickering, commented that
nonprofit organizations are "a huge and important force in many issues of American
policy .... NGOs are in fact the driving force").
210.
See, e.g., Dietrich, supra note 183, at 283-84 (remarking that although
interest groups have considerable access to the policy system, their policy influence
remains limited).
211.
See supra note 23.
212.
For example, the Gates Foundation financially supports children's
vaccination programs, projects aimed at preventing and treating infectious diseases,
and initiatives for combating HIV/AIDS in developing countries. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text (giving financial support data of the Gates Foundation). The
International Medical Corps (IMC), established as a domestic 501(c)(3) organization in 1984,
works with communities in urban and rural areas, isolated villages, refugee camps, disaster
sites, and frontline hospitals to provide essential health services. In response to the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, IMC has directly delivered medical services to victims abroad.
International Medical Corps, http://www.imcworldwide.org/ whatwedo hiv.shtml (last
visited Sept. 7, 2006); see also The African Salvation Group, http://www.asgroup.org/
englishlindex.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) (describing ASG as a non-profit
organization working to promote health education and prevention for under-served
communities in New York City and Sub-Saharan Africa).
213.
For example, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation and the Ford
Foundation actively provide financing for reproductive health care and family
planning. See The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, http://www.packard.org/
categoryList.aspx?RootCatlD=3&CategorylD=62 (last visited Sept. 2, 2006); The Ford
Foundation, http://www.fordfound.org/program/education.cfm (last visited Sept. 2,
2006) (describing the Sexuality and Reproductive Health field, used to build knowledge
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organizations have made grants and initiated health and medical
education projects, healthcare training services to communities, and
training programs for healthcare workers abroad. 214 Private
foundations have funded research on drugs, gene therapy, and other
medical treatments for combating diseases afflicting men, women,
and children worldwide. 215 They have financially supported health
policy issues aimed at promoting global health equity and
international public health policy initiatives. 216 Frequently as first
responsible responders, often impelled by inadequate U.S.
government reaction, domestic nonprofits have formulated their
contributions to and involvement in global health matters when
major diseases and medical needs are detected and as overseas
geographic areas and population segments requiring assistance are
identified.

and develop policy of sexuality). Other foundations have provided grants for
reproductive health and family planning projects abroad, including the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
See The William and
Flora Hewlett
Foundation, http://www.hewlett.org/
Programs/Population] (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (promoting voluntary family planning
and good reproductive health); The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
http://www.macfound.org/site/c.IkLXJ8MQKrH/b.932747/k.B59A/InternationaLGrantmaki
ngPopulationandReproductiveHealth.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006). Numerous public
charities are involved in providing reproductive health and family planning services
overseas. See, e.g., Centre for Development and Population Activities, http://www.cedpa.org/
sectionlwhatwedo (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (detailing the various programs designed to
improve the lives of women and girls around the world); EngenderHealth, Inc.,
http://www.engenderhealth.org/mission/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (working
to improve the lives of individuals by making reproductive and family planning
services safe and available).
214.
For example, IMC trains local workers and establishes quality, sustainable
health and economic development systems in war-torn, impoverished regions of the
world. It has trained local healthcare workers in Africa to care for HIV infected
patients and has provided health education to African communities riddled by
HIV/AIDS in order "to promote preventive practices and fight stigma and ignorance."
International Medical Corps, http://www.imcworldwide.org/whatwedohiv.shtml (last
visited Sept. 2, 2006). The Academic Alliance Foundation for AIDS Care and
Prevention in Africa also focuses on training, treating, and developing research
strategies within the countries that are most affected by diseases. AAF: Enabling
Innovative Solutions to the Global HIV/AIDS Crisis, http://www.academicalliance
foundation.org/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
215.
See, e.g., Bristol Myers Squibb Foundation, http'//www.bms.com/sr/philanthropy
data/backgr.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (detailing its philanthropic efforts); Merck
Company Foundation, http://www.merck.com/cr/company-profilet philanthropy-at_merck/
themerck_companyfoundationl (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (describing philanthropy at Merck,
including product donations and development of medicines).
216.
The Rockefeller Foundation has funded public health policy initiatives and
global health equity projects. See Rockefeller Foundation, http://www.rockfound.org/
Grantmaking/Health (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (describing various programs and
grants made to reduce differences in the health status of populations).
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B. Limitations of Unofficial Role
One thus might consider the world fortunate that our domestic
nonprofits are such integral actors in foreign health policymaking
and implementation. Nonetheless, there are distinct real or potential
limitations to their informal role.
First, there is negligible public accountability for, and
transparency by which, nonprofit organizations privately create a
substratum of foreign health policy. While nonprofits freely develop
many worthwhile global health initiatives for politically vulnerable
minorities abroad, they generally do so with tax advantaged funds.
This tax advantage carries with it a responsibility for openness and
public accountability.
Second, where nonprofit organizations are the primary, or
sometimes even the exclusive, unofficial responders to global health
needs, the response conceivably can suffer from a lack of
orchestration on several levels. On a macro foreign policy level, if and
when nonprofit entities act without consultation with governmental
policymakers, they may interfere inadvertently with unrelated
foreign affairs and consequently create tensions or unanticipated
problems. They may unintentionally impede certain diplomatic
processes. 2 17 On a micro foreign policy level, where nonprofit entities
do not consult with one another and do not orchestrate their plans,
projects, and funding, their efforts can be duplicative and the
potential impact of outcomes diluted.
Third, informal interaction of nonprofits with the president is
subject to the previously discussed notable constraint of presidential
advisors' and staff members' acting as gatekeepers. Those
gatekeepers easily might exclude many knowledgeable nonprofit
organizations in favor of the inclusion primarily of elite, rich, 218
established, sympathetic, financially supportive, and politically
agreeable nonprofits. 219 The executive gate keeping mechanism

217.
This Article does not suggest that there should be harmony between the
government and nonprofits with respect to all matters of foreign health policy. Indeed,
often to the benefit of political minorities abroad, U.S. foreign policy formulation
regularly has been marked by disharmonies between governmental officials and
leaders of nonprofit organizations. For example, notwithstanding President Reagan's
and President George W. Bush's imposition of the Mexico City Policy, also known as
the global gag rule, U.S. nonprofits have financially supported reproductive health
projects and family planning services that have benefited people in Third World
countries. See, e.g., Centre for Development and Population Activities, supra note 213;
EngenderHealth, Inc., supra note 213.
218.
Political participation in the United States has long depended upon wealth
and economic power, which have heavily biased political outcomes. See SIDNEY VERBA,
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: Civic
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3-11 (1995).
219.
See LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 175. For example, a

conservative president may be more likely to initiate discussions with conservative
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obviously has the ability to readily deny access by groups and entities
that represent certain unpopular or politically risky views, causes,
and people. Therefore, small nonprofit affinity groups generally are
not granted direct contact with the president, despite the fact that
they have the potential to be 'an advance alert system' . . . to raise
the visibility of emerging social problems and policy issues." 220
Overall, the system permits a distortion of information access and
limits vigorous discussions of important concerns and large and
perhaps innovative ideas with the nation's primary foreign policy
decisionmaker.
Finally, the public may speculate that interactions of the select
few nonprofit representatives who directly interact behind closed
doors with the president include more than exchanges of ideas and
expertise. The absence of public scrutiny and accountability can
damage confidence in the appropriateness of interests represented,
information transmitted, terms of deals arranged, and subsequent
221
satisfaction of negotiated obligations.
C. PracticalReasons for an Official Role
Providing an official institutionalized role for nonprofits at the
president's foreign health policymaking table could positively attend
to the above identified limitations of the current system. A modified
system could and should be structured to include a broader base of
nonprofit "service bureaus" (and thus a wider range of people they
represent). 222 It should enhance the flow of high quality information;
directly bring greater expertise, analysis, and innovative ideas to
long-range global health policy matters; provide a forum for the
22 3
exchange of controversial proposals and for deliberate feedback;
and create vigorous discussion. Alteration must proceed with caution
to ensure that the president's foreign health policymaking process
evolves into opportunities for constructive interchange on serious
global health matters by responsible participants. It should include

think tanks, and a liberal president may be more likely to initiate input from liberal
think tanks.
220.
Gibbons, supra note 84, at 11 (citing FUNDERS CONCERNED ABOUT AIDS,
MEMORANDUM 2 (Oct. 1, 1991)).
221.
A similar argument has been made for providing international
nongovernmental organizations a formal role in international decision-making. Peter J.
Spiro, Essays: The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations:
Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161-69 (2002).
222.
Nonprofit organizations can represent a broad spectrum of people who
otherwise may be unrepresented, marginalized, or under-represented in policymaking.
See Crimm, supra note 51, at 658 n.304 (2005).
223.
See Kurt Wilk, International Organization and the International Chamber
of Commerce, 55 Pol. Sci. Q. 231, 244-47 (1940) (suggesting a similar advantage for
international groups with respect to international measures).
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increased transparency of process and public accountability of all
official participants who contribute to identifying the global health
problems, determine risks and stakes of action and inaction, define
policy options, and otherwise enable the president to set and
implement an appropriate foreign health policy agenda.
Under a modified system, as U.S. foreign health policy is defined,
adopted, and executed, all formal participants would have a stake in
the outcome and be subject to public scrutiny. Thus, the institutional
inclusion of nonprofits could offer a more transparent and balanced
political enterprise, enhance the operative democratic principles of
our nation, 224 restrain inordinate executive power through increased

224.
There is some philosophical support for a modified foreign policymaking
system that could enhance the democratic workings of the nation. Philosophers have
long extolled the virtues of the autonomy of both government and free associations,
such as nonprofit organizations, that exist within civil society. Each has separate
responsibilities that should be free from intervention by the other, and hence their
independence must be maintained. But philosophers, such as Alexis de Tocqueville,
Hegel, and John Mill, suggest in various fashions that a government's competencies
are subject to limitations and thus can be enhanced by cooperation and interchange.
Alexis de Tocquville suggested that there must be cooperation between civil society and
government to check the sovereign state's power. See HARVEY MITCHELL, AMERICA
AFTER TOCQUEVILLE 242-43 (2002) (stating that to "check the sovereign
state ... might arise through a theory that fused civil society and state and ended the
dichotomy" and the "centralization of a power by a regulatory administrative
regime ... was a harbinger of a democracy wrenched from its pristine moorings,
ending in a new kind of despotism where choices would become illusory"). John
Stewart Mill criticizes the ruler who takes it upon himself to make every decision
without meaningful input by others. John Stewart Mill, Considerations on
Representative Government, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYs 205, 238-42 (John Gray
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1861). Hegel claimed that if a nation's government,
which he depicted as an animal organism, fails to work cooperatively as members but
instead acts as distinct and separate "parts of the animal," the "isolation and
independence spell[s] disease." T.M. KNOX, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 180 (1952)

(interpreting Hegel's work published in 1821 regarding feudal states). John Rawls
advised that to ward off such disease and eliminate the gravest forms of political
injustices, just institutions and policies must be established. John Rawls, The Law of
Peoples, in The LAW OF PEOPLES 7 (1999). Thus, for the democratic government
machinery to best serve the interests of its people (and those common to people of other
regimes), informed deliberation by decisionmakers is essential. Such informed
deliberation is dependent on the inclusion of different perspectives and ideas. As John
Rawls recognized, this may necessitate the establishment of new alliances or new
institutions and practices to serve as a kind of confederative center and public forum.
Id. at 3. Rawls considered that evils in society can be alleviated by creating just and
decent institutions. Id. at 7. This Article suggests that it is consistent with this belief to
reformulate the institutions now in place that permit U.S. global health policymakers
to ignore the "evils" that threaten people overseas and that ultimately impact U.S.
citizens' health, the nation's economic stability, and national security.
What Alexis de Tocqueville suggested centuries ago after his eighteenth century
post-Revolutionary War visit to America is all the more applicable in the twenty-first
century. The truly globalized world of the new millennium requires a whole new
political science. See JOHN C. KORITANSKY, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND THE NEW
SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 3 (1986) (stating

that Toqueville "will present a 'new political science for a world itself quite new').
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accountability, imbue the presidential foreign policymaking processes
with a new legitimacy, and further the interests of U.S. citizens and
people across the globe.

V. CONSTRUCTING AN APPROPRIATE POLICYMAKING STRUCTURE

A. Paradigmsof Nongovernmental Organizations'Participation
in
InternationalBodies'PolicymakingProcesses
There is no magical best structure for achieving the integration
of domestic nonprofit organizations as official actors in the president's
foreign health policymaking processes.
Paradigms that provide
formal arrangements for the participation of NGOs 225 in various
international bodies charged with goals of rule making and
policymaking authority incorporate qualities and some functions
comparable to the one envisioned here. Therefore, six possible models,
each with different features, are discussed below.
Because no one of the six paradigms presents an entirely
suitable arrangement for the task at hand, formulation of a new
structure should draw upon a composite of the models' most
appropriate attributes. Each of the six models-the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the NGO-World Bank Committee, the WHO,
the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the U.N.'s
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)-contain negative and
positive characteristics. Clearly, the pervasively weak traits of each
paradigm should be avoided, and the structure of a paradigm
considered as lacking overall operational effectiveness should not be
adopted without considerable modification. In particular, the WTO
paradigm does not recognize direct involvement by NGOs in the work

Perhaps the world of today requires the official "wise men" of U.S. global health
policymaking to adapt "to take advantage of the . . . good qualities which may
at ... [this] time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes." Mill,
supra, at 226 (referring to a meritorious element of a government that displays good
qualities). In other words, it may be time to officially integrate nonprofit organizations,
which can give a powerful and meaningful voice to a range of global health concerns
and needs, into the U.S. foreign health policy decision-making apparatus. By
undertaking this strategy, the world's image of the U.S. government might be
enhanced. Through such implementation of "soft power," the U.S. government might
achieve more successes in world politics. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFr POWER: THE
MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 60-61 (2004) (claiming that the attractiveness
of the United States depends in part on the values, substance, and style of U.S. foreign
policy).
225.
See generally Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partnerfor
Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 937, 940-44 (2003) (discussing the definition of NGOs).
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of the WTO, an attribute to avoid. Such direct involvement is
important in a new presidential foreign health policymaking
structure for purposes of NGO public accountability and contributions
of diverse and informed perspectives. Many, but not all,
characteristics of the NGO-World Bank Committee and the WHO
models are eschewed because these models have been forcefully
criticized as overly complex and ineffective. 226 On the other hand, the
ILO, the OECD, and ECOSOC have been considered largely effective
and contain numerous positive attributes that should be imported
into a new presidential foreign health policymaking structure.
After briefly outlining the various attributes of the six models,
this Article suggests those characteristics that may help cure
infirmities of the current processes. The Article then suggests how
these attributes might be aggregated and utilized in a
constitutionally acceptable and functionally appropriate structure
that extends a significant official role to nonprofits.
1.

World Trade Organization

The WTO is the only international organization dealing with the
global rules of trade between nations dedicated to promoting
economic globalization and free trade. 227 It currently includes 149
member countries. 228 The WTO has two major functions, one
legislative and another judicial. It is a forum for member nations to
negotiate and develop by consensus trade rules, policies, and
agreements with the goal of helping "producers of goods and services,
exporters, and importers conduct their business" 229 by reducing or
eliminating international trade barriers. 230 The WTO also functions
as a trade dispute resolution body, although it has no significant
23 1
enforcement power other than sanctions.
Upon its 1994 formation, the WTO adopted a formal consultative
233
role for NGOs. 232 According to Article V of the Marrakesh Protocol,

See infra Parts V.A.2 and V.A.3.
226.
The WTO in Brief, http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis-elinbrief_e/
227.
inbr00_e.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
See id. Development of rules and treaties by consensus has been criticized
230.
as permitting unfair influence by powerful nations and as resulting in favoritism for
multinational corporations and wealthy countries. See Wikipedia, World Trade
Organization, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWTO (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) (offering
criticisms of the WTO, including that the operation has a systematic bias toward rich
countries and multinational corporations).
231.
WTO - Understanding the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatis e/tife/displ-e.htm (last visited Sept. 3,2006).
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
232.
15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wtoe.htm#articleV.
233.
Id.
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the WTO General Council has discretion to "make appropriate
arrangements
for
consultation
and
cooperation
with
nongovernmental organizations concerned with matters related to
those of the WTO. ''234 Two years later, to establish that relationship
the WTO General Council adopted "Guidelines for Arrangements on
23 5
Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations" (Guidelines).
The Guidelines acknowledge the importance of the public's image
of WTO activities and in this regard suggest that better
communications with NGOs and greater organizational transparency
are key to this end. 23 6 Nonetheless, the Guidelines adopt the view
that NGOs should not be "directly involved in the work of the WTO or
its meetings. ' 237 Instead, the Secretariat should have more active
interactions with NGOs, which, as a "valuable resource," can
contribute to public discourse and on an ad hoc basis might
participate in some manner in symposia, present information helpful
to delegates, and respond to requests for general information and
briefings about the WTO. 238 The Guidelines authorize a WTO council
or committee chairperson to interact with NGOs in an official
capacity (as opposed to a personal capacity) only if the council or
239
committee approves.
Thus, the Marrakesh Protocol and the Guidelines established at
most the illusion of an official role for NGOs in formal WTO
processes. 240 These documents do not encourage NGOs, as voices for
under-represented or unrepresented people, to formally, regularly,
and reliably provide input to the member nations negotiating trade
policies. This model, therefore, is inadequate for a new presidential
foreign health policymaking structure.
2.

The NGO-World Bank Committee

The World Bank, a development bank that provides loans, policy
advice, and technical assistance to developing countries, states that
its mission is "global poverty reduction and improvement of living

234.
Id. The Marrakesh Protocol establishing the WTO was the culmination of
the 1986-1994 GATT negotiations of the Uruguay Round. Wikipedia, supra note 230.
235.
Guideline for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental
Organizations, July 18, 1996, available at http://www.wto.org/englishlforums-e/
ngo.e/guide-e.htm.
236.
Id. at art. II.
237.
Id. at art. VI.
238.
Id. at art. IV.
239.
Id. at art. V.
240.
See INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., ACCREDITATION
SCHEMES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
FORA 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter ACCREDITATION SCHEMES] (remarking that thus far the

WTO has opted for an ad hoc management of the relationship between the WTO and
nongovernmental organizations).

TOWARD FACILITATING A VOICE

2006]

1097

standards. '24 1 It undertakes initiatives intended to foster job creation
and empower the poor, 242 and it acknowledges the importance of
NGOs in accomplishing these global goals.
In 1981, sixteen international NGOs and the World Bank formed
the NGO-World Bank Committee in an effort to strengthen their
relationship, dialogue, and exchange. 243 The NGO-World Bank
discussion of
Committee is intended as a vehicle for collaborative
244
World Bank policies, programs, and projects.
The NGO-World Bank Committee is composed of World Bank
senior managers and a global steering committee, currently composed
of fifteen international, national, and regional NGOs from countries
around the world. 245 The global steering committee's NGO
participants are elected by the NGO Working Group on the World
Bank (NGOWG), an autonomous group open to NGOs worldwide
concerned about and involved in equitable and sustainable
246
development.
The NGOWG attempts to be globally focused, but it concentrates
increasingly on establishing liaison capacity with networks of
countries' regional and local NGOs. 247 The current ambition to
establish liaisons defines the NGOWG's present priorities. To this
end, NGOWG intends its research projects and information sharing
to strengthen the World Bank's dialogue with NGOs, the
expansiveness of its regional work and meetings in developing
countries, and the selection of diverse NGOs to serve on the NGO248
World Bank steering committee.

World Bank - About Us, http://web.worldbank.orgWBSITEEXTERNAIJEXTAB
241.
(last visited Sept. 3,
OUTUS/O,,pagePK50004410-piPK.36602-theSitePK:29708,00.html
2006).
242.
World Bank About Us, Challenge, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040565-menuPK: 1696892-pagePK:511236
44~piPK:329829-theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2006); see World Bank About Us - Annual and Spring Meetings, http://web.worldbank.orgfWBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTABOUTUS/,,contentMDK:20042540isCURL:Y-menuPK:58865-pagePK:34542-piP
K:36600-theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) (explaining that World Bank
facilitates various fora to facilitate interaction among the government, the Bank, and
NGOs).
NGO Working Group on the World Bank, http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/
243.
p.willetts/NGOWG/INDEX.HTM#History (lastvisited Sept. 3, 2006).
244.
Id. The NGO-World Bank Committee meets twice per year, and its agenda
is established jointly by the NGO Working Group on the World Bank (NGOWG) and
the Bank. See ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 12.
245.

Id. at 11.

246.
Id.
247.
Id. at 11-12; see NGO Working Group on the World Bank,
http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOWG/INDEX.HTM (last visited Sept. 3, 2006)
(describing the decentralization of the Working Group, resulting in more regional
meetings).
248.
NGO Working Group on the World Bank, supra note 247.
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For years, the NGOWG met annually to elect members of the
NGO-World Bank steering committee and to recommend to the
steering committee priorities for the annual NGO-World Bank
Committee meeting. From 1995 through 1997, the NGOWG
249
decentralized its approach, dividing the world into seven regions
and commencing regional meetings to elect members of the NGOWorld Bank steering committee. 250 The NGOWG intended this
restructuring to promote a broader range of NGO participation, foster
regional versions of the NGO-World Bank Committee, utilize regional
meetings to elect members of the global steering committee, and
strengthen grassroots input into World Bank Initiatives. 251 Three
years later, the NGO-World Bank Committee itself endorsed a joint
resolution between the World Bank and the NGOWG to further
enhance relations, promote involvement of a larger range of civil
society organizations, and facilitate a wider range of regional
2 52
activities.
These complex participatory structures and stated ideals purport
to involve a wide group of NGOs in issues and projects important to
the World Bank and civil society around the world.253 The broad
inclusion of NGOs has advantages, and the inclusivity should foster
collaboration among local and regional NGOs at regional conferences.
But in reality collaboration among local and regional NGOs
frequently occurs outside the formal processes, which critics regard as
potentially rendering official processes less effective. The breadth of
NGO representation also should bring diverse but well considered,
persuasive, and informed perspectives to NGO-World Bank
Committee meetings. Restricted public access to NGO-World Bank
Committee meetings, however, may diminish the effectiveness of the
NGO stakeholders relative to that of the World Bank

249.
The regions are: (1) Africa, (2) East Asia and Pacific, (3) Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, (4) Latin America and the Caribbean, (5) Middle East and North
Africa, (6) South Asia, and (7) West Europe and North America. Id.
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
The 1999 World Bank's annual report proclaimed:
Involvement is sought at all phases of the Bank's work-planning and design of
projects, implementation, and impact evaluation-because participation
improves the quality, effectiveness, and sustainability of development
activities. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society
groups play an increasingly critical role in ensuring that Bank-supported
projects are participatory in nature, through both their own involvement and
their ability to reach out to other stakeholders-especially poor and excluded
communities.
THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. 139 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org

htmlextpb/annrep99/down.htm.
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representatives. 254 Moreover, closed doors allow little transparency
and limited public accountability about what transpires in those
meetings. Despite the achievement of some significant initiatives as a
result of the NGOWG and the NGO-World Bank Committee
processes, 25 5 many NGOs have criticized these collaborative outcomes
and have faulted the participatory structures as merely World Bank
public relations tools. 256 These problems must be avoided in adopting
a new structure for the president's foreign health policymaking.
3.

U.N.'s World Health Organization

The WHO, the U.N.'s specialized agency for health created in
1948, seeks to enable people globally to attain a high level of
health. 257 The World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO's governing
body, is composed of 192 member states. 258 Among the WHA's main
responsibilities is the determination of the WHO's policies and
programs. 259 The WHA appoints a Director-General, who serves as
260
the head of the WHO.

254.
The effectiveness of the NGO-World Bank Committee is called into
question by occasional media reports on conflicts between the World Bank and the
interests of poor people whom it serves. Several such illustrative reports indicate that,
despite the involvement of NGOs in the NGOWG and the NGO-World Bank
Committee, the World Bank advocates privatizing water rights, even where doing so
would be diametrically opposed to the interests of villagers' needs for access to sanitary
water. See Tim Kessler, From Social Contractto Private Contracts: The Privatisationof
Health, Education and Basic Infrastructure - A Review of the 2003 Social Watch
Country Reports, available at http://www.socialwatch.org/en/informesTematicos/
58.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) (describing how privatization of essential services,
such as water provision, has serious consequences for the world's poorest people);
Joanne Green, Water as a Human Right and the Commercialisationof Water, available
at http://www.tear.org.au/resources/harambee/02 1/water as-a human right.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2006) (arguing that commercialization of water will result in high
prices that will decrease access to it).
255.
See NGO Working Group Proposal, http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/
NGOWG/PROPTEXT.HTM (describing several initiatives, including participation, capacity
building, concessional lending, and relations with other stakeholders).
256.
See, e.g., id. (commenting that former World Bank President James
Wolfensohn admitted that 30% of the World Bank initiatives to combat poverty have
failed in their objectives); Choike.org, Civil Society Cooperation and the World Bank
Reform, http://www.choike.org/nuevo-eng/informes/1753.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2006) (commenting that NGOs often feel that they are being used merely as a public
relations tool).
257.
See WHO, about WHO, http://www.who.int/about/en (last visited Sept. 3,
2006) ("WHO's objective, as set out in its Constitution, is the attainment by all peoples
of the highest possible level of health.").
258.
See id.
259.
WHO, Governance, http://www.who.int/governance/en. (last visited Sept. 3,
2006) (describing the WHA's primary functions as determining the policies of the
WHO, supervising financial policies, and approving program budget).
260.
Id.
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In accordance with Article 1 of the WHO's Constitution, the
WHO may make "suitable arrangements for consultation and
cooperation" with NGOs. 261 The WHO's Principles Governing
Relations with Nongovernmental Organizations (Principles), specify
that such arrangements can be in the form of both official and
informal relationships between the WHO and NGOs. 262 But any
official relationship must be preceded by at least a two year informal
collaborative working relationship. 263 The Principles provide that
those NGOs that are eligible for official status are normally
international organizations 264 with a federated composition (of
national or regional groups or having individual members from
different countries), foundations that raise financial resources for
health development in different countries, and other bodies that
26 5
promote international health.
As of 2002, 189 NGOs had official status in the WHO. 266 That
status entitles them, but not those NGOs with merely informal
status, to appoint a representative to participate in WHO meetings,
conferences, and committees. 267 In no event do official NGOs have
voting rights. 268 In meetings, conferences, and committees, however,
they may discuss items of particular interest to them and their
constituencies, submit expository statements at the chairperson's
invitation or upon agreement to an NGO's request, have access to
non-confidential documents as the WHO Director-General permits,
and present a memorandum to the Director-General for circulation as
269
he permits.
With the agreement of the WHO Director-General, the U.N.'s
Civil Society Initiative commissioned a report to review the
effectiveness of the NGO-WHO dual relationship system. 270 The 2002
report criticized several aspects of these relationships, including the

261.
WHO, Principles Governing Relations with Nongovernmental Organizations,
princ. 1.1, http://www.who.int/civilsociety/relations/principles/en/index.html
[hereinafter
Principles].
262.
See id. at princ. 2.4 (identifying the types of relationships between NGOs
and the WHO).
263.
See id.
264.
See id. at princ. 3.5 (stating that in exceptional circumstances, national
NGOs can be considered for official relations with the WHO).
265.
See id. at princ. 3.4.
266.
CHRISTOPHER LANORD, A STUDY OF WHO'S OFFICIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 5, June 2002, available at http://www.who.

int/civilsociety/documents/en/study.pdf.
267.
Principles, supra note 261, at princ. 6.1
268.
See id. (authorizing the right to participate without the right to vote).
269.
See id. (describing the "privileges conferred by official relationship").
National NGOs generally submit their views through their government representatives
or their affiliated official international NGOs. See id. at princ. 6.4. Nonetheless,
national and regional NGOs may obtain participation privileges with WHO regional
offices. See id. at princ. 6.3.
270.
LANORD, supra note 266, at 4.
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application process to obtain official NGO status as excessively
arduous and bureaucratic, 271 the interests of some official NGOs'
concerns as inappropriately political or commercial, 272 actual
attendance of official NGOs at WHA meetings as underrepresentative of all official NGOs, 27 3 and the submission of written
statements and receipt of non-confidential documents as unduly
restrictive, minimizing meaningful NGO participation. 274 Again, such
structurally related deficiencies must be avoided in formulating a
new presidential foreign health policymaking system.
4.

International Labor Organization

The ILO is a specialized agency that the U.N. created to promote
social justice and international recognition of human and labor
rights. 275 Among its tasks, the ILO sets international labor
standards. 276 Its annual International Labor Conference (ILC) has
three official participants: NGOs representing employers, NGOs
representing workers, and the 178 member governments. 277 The ILC
is tasked with making policy, suggesting legislative and practical
recommendations on labor matters, and proposing standards in the
278
form of conventions for member states' ratification.
To accomplish its goals, the ILO Constitution provides official
means for participation of the employer and worker NGOs in ILO
affairs. The constitution broadly provides that the ILO must
cooperate with "any general international organization entrusted
with the co-ordination of the activities of public international
organizations having specialized responsibilities and with public

271.
See id. (describing the process for gaining official status as "long,"
"burdensome," and "cumbersome").
272.
Id. at 5.
273.
Id. at 5, 7.
274.
Id. at 7. The report made recommendations for changes, which have been
discussed at the WHA but not adopted to date. See WHO, Status of Proposal,
http://www.who.int/civilsociety/relations/new-policy/enlindex.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2006) (recounting extensive debate of the policy but ultimately postponing
consideration of it); WHO, WHA concludes: adopts key resolutions affecting global
public health, May 25, 2005, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/
pr-wha06/en/index.html (not reporting adoption of the recommended changes for
official status at the May 25, 2005 WTA meeting).
275.
ILO, About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2006).
276.
Id.
277.
See ILO, Alphabetical List of ILO Countries, http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
278.
See International Labour Standards, ILO Conventions and Recommendations,
http://www.ilo.org/publicenghshstandards/normlintroduction/what.htm (last visited Sept. 3,
2006) (describing the legal instruments, either conventions and recommendations, drawn up
by the ILO). The most recently adopted major convention was the Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention of 1999. Id.
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international organizations having specialized responsibilities in
related fields." 279 The constitution further permits, but does not
mandate, the ILO to allow public international organization
representatives to participate without vote in ILO deliberations and
to make arrangements for recognized international NGOs to consult
with the ILO. 280 These general constitutional articles are given more
specific practical application in other provisions that address the
annual ILC.
At each annual ILC, member state representatives are entitled
28 1
to vote on all matters taken into consideration by the conference.
Participation at the ILC by employer and worker NGOs, however,
depends upon a state's representative nominating an NGO as a
delegate or advisor. 28 2 In particular, the constitution provides that,
after complying with written procedures, a state's representative may
appoint worker and employer NGO agents as its deputy delegates. 283
The advisor, while acting as the deputy, is permitted to speak and
vote at the ILC. 284 If, however, only one NGO agent is appointed,
that NGO is allowed to speak at the ILC but not to vote. 28 5 Absent
fulfillment of the requisite written procedures, an NGO may act
solely in an advisory capacity to the representative. 286 In that
situation, the NGO advisor is prohibited from speaking except on the
representative's request and by special authorization of the ILC
28 8
president.28 7 Such an advising NGO cannot vote at the ILC.
This ILO constitutional structure thus extends to NGOs the
potential for an official, formal role "approaching parity" to that of
member states at an ILC in making policy, advancing legislative and
practical recommendations on labor matters, and proposing labor
standards. 289 Because NGOs are not merely engaged in hallway
politics but assume a spokesperson role, a voter role, or both, their
public accountability is reinforced. This attribute should be emulated
in a new structure for presidential foreign health policymaking.

279.
Constitution of the International Labor Organization, art. 12(1) (Oct. 9,
1946), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/englishIabout/iloconst.htm.
280.
Id. art. 12(2)-(3).
281.
Id. art. 4(1).
282.
Id. art. 3(5).
283.
Id. art. 3(7)
284.
Id.
285.
Id. art. 4(2).
286.
Id. art. 3(6).
287.
Id.
288.
Id.
289.
Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. &
POL'Y SYMP. 19, 26 (1997).
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

The OECD, 290 an organization composed of thirty developed
market member countries, 291 is committed globally to democratic
government, promoting "the highest sustainable growth of their
economies," and improving "the economic and social well-being' of
their citizens. 292 In consultation and cooperation with seventy nonmember states, 293 predominantly emerging or developing countries,
and civil society organizations, the OECD identifies and pursues
policies and undertakes efforts to "foster prosperity and fight poverty
through economic growth, financial stability, trade and investment,
technology, innovation, entrepreneurship and development cooperation." 294 The OECD generates international instruments, 295
decisions, and recommendations to promote countries' growth and
progress in the globalized economy. 296 It is an organization where
exchanges and policy research on topics of mutual concern and
297
interest occur.
With the 1960 adoption of the Convention on the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD created its
basic authority to establish and maintain relations with non-member
states and organizations. 298 Two years later, the OECD's ruling body,
the Council, adopted a decision providing for consultation with
NGOs. 299 This decision establishes three criteria for NGO official

"consultative status": the NGO must have (1) wide responsibility in
general economic matters or in a specific economic sector, (2)

290.
The OECD originated as the Organization for European Economy Co-operation
(OEEC), to assist in the administration of the Marshall Plan in reconstructing Europe
following World War II. Its membership was extended later to non-European states. In
1961, the OEEC was reformed into the OECD. NationMaster Encyclopedia: The OECD,
http://www.nationmaster.comencyclopedia/OECD (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
291.
All thirty member countries are democracies and they share "a commitment to
democratic government and the market economy." OECD, About the OECD, http://www.
oecd.org/about (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
292.
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Dec. 14 1960, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_ 2649_201185
1915847_1_1_1,00.html.
293.
OECD, About the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about (last visited Sept. 2,
2006).
294.
OECD, Overview of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_
2649_201185_2068050_1_11 1,00.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
295.
See id. (noting member countries adopt, and non-member countries are
invited to subscribe to, OECD agreements and treaties).
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
298.
This authority is conferred on the OECD Council, which is composed of all
member countries. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, supra note 292, art. 12(b).
299.
David A. Wirth, Public Participation in International Processes:
Environmental Case Studies and the National and International Levels, 7 COLO. J.
INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 20 (1996).
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affiliated bodies belonging to all or most OECD member countries,
300
and (3) substantial representation of nongovernmental interests.
Few nongovernmental organizations qualify under these standards;
30 1
currently only five NGOs have consultative status with the OECD.
The two primary NGOs with consultative status are the Trade Union
Advisory Committee (TUAC) and the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee (BIAC).
In 1962, BIAC was created, and officially recognized by the
OECD as an umbrella organization to actively represent the interests
of its industrial and employer constituents drawn from the thirty
member states of the OECD. 302 BIAC has its own standing
committees that functionally mirror OECD committees. Therefore,
each BIAC standing committee, as well as BIAC task forces and
policy groups, can identify important emerging topics, address longterm issues, and develop positions important to its constituents and
the OECD members. 30 3 BIAC positions are structured as consensus
documents, enabling BIAC to speak with one voice for all members at
OECD meetings, global forums, and in consultations with OECD
30 4
leaders, government delegates, committees, and working groups.
TUAC coordinates and represents policy views of trade unions
from the industrialized member countries of the OECD. 305 Its
constituents are fifty-six national trade unions, which together
represent approximately 66 million workers.3 0 6 TUAC does not have
standing committees that mirror the OECD committees. Instead, it
has working groups on economic policy, global trade and investment,
and education, training and labor market policy that prepare TUAC
3
positions for consultations with the OECD. 07
BIAC's and TUAC's consultations with the OECD, for which the
OECD chief administrative officer, the Secretary-General, is tasked
to maintain and administer, 30 8 can occur through three separate
means of formal exchange. First, communications and involvement
can be through the OECD's NGO Liaison Committee, which is
responsible directly to the OECD Council, the main acting body of the

300.
See id.
301.
See id. at 12 n.22.
302.
BIAC, About the BIAC, http://www.biac.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Sept.
2, 2006).
303.
BIAC, Policy Work and Advocacy, http://www.biac.org/policywork.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2006).
304.
Id.
305.
TUAC, About TUAC, http://www.tuac.org/about/cabout.htm (last visited
Sept. 2, 2006).
306.
Id.
307.
TUAC, How TUAC Works, http://www.tuac.org/how/chow.htm (last visited
Sept. 2, 2006).
308.
ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 12.
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OECD. 30 9 Second, BIAC and TUAC can be participants at special
meetings of OECD committees. If permitted, they may express views
orally or through position papers, but gatekeepers may limit their
participatory role to one of an observer. 3 10 And the NGOs do not have
the right to propose agenda items for the meetings. 31 1 Finally, the
consultative NGOs can be invited to participate at sessions of an
OECD subsidiary body. 3 12 But in no situation does a consultative
3 13
NGO have voting rights.
OECD leaders as gatekeepers also can control BIAC's and
TUAC's access to OECD documents. The consultative NGOs may
request general information on the work of the OECD and may ask
for OECD documents and summaries often unavailable to the public
and other entities, 314 but there is no assurance that they will obtain
access to requested materials.
In sum, there are established means for consultative NGOs, as
representatives of their constituencies, to be official participants in
the OECD policy consideration processes. Although this attribute is
positive, there appears to be little regularization of ongoing
participation levels. 315 A notably constructive feature of BIAC's and
TUAC's formal roles is that functionally, on behalf of their respective
constituents, each presents a united force and a singular view to the
actual policy decisionmakers. Thus, certain characteristics of the
OECD model should be imported into a restructured presidential
foreign health policymaking structure, while others should be
avoided.
6.

U.N.'s Economic and Social Council

The U.N.'s ECOSOC is designed to promote social and economic
progress, encourage respect for human rights, and identify solutions
for health problems. 316 ECOSOC coordinates the work of its

309.

Convention

on

the

Organization

for

Economic

Co-operation

and

Development, supra note 292, at art. 7; see ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240,

at 12 (stating that the Council is chaired by the Secretary- General and composed of all
permanent members). BIAC and TUAC can initiate the participation, as can the OECD
Secretary-General. ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 12.
310.
See ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 12 (stating that BIAC and

TUAC can initiate the participation, as can committee officers).
311.

Id. at 21.

312.
The consultation invitation comes from the Secretary- General at the
request of the chair of the OECD subsidiary body. Id. at 12.
313.
Id. at 12, 21.
314.

Id.

315.
See Wirth, supra note 299, at 31 (stating that there are no objective
standards and participation varies widely).
316.
ECOSOC, Background, http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/ecosoc-background.
html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
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specialized agencies, 317 programs, and commissions, and it issues
318
policy recommendations to the U.N. General Assembly.
Article 71 of the U.N. Charter provides for formal consultative
status of NGOs to ECOSOC through "suitable arrangements. 3' 19 The
main purposes of consultative status arrangement are to benefit
ECOSOC by NGOs sharing their expertise and to enable NGOs to
express "important elements of public opinion" and other valuable
perspectives. 320 NGOs also serve as technical experts and advisors,
and they raise awareness of issues unknown, overlooked, or ignored
32 1
by the U.N. with the aim of influencing diplomats' decisions.
In practice, NGOs participate widely and extensively. 322
323
Currently, over 2,700 NGOs enjoy ECOSOC consultative status.
Each of these NGOs is recognized as having consultative status for
"matters falling within the competence of the Economic & Social
Council and its subsidiary bodies. '3 24 Each consultative NGO must

317.
See Principles, supra note 261, at print. 1.2 (last visited Sept. 2, 2006)
(including the specialized U.N. agency, the WHO). For further discussion of WHO, see
supraPart V.A. 1.c.
318.
Principles, supra note 261, at princ. 1.2.
319.
U.N. Charter art. 71. Consultative arrangements are limited to "matters within
its competence." Id.; see also CHIANG PEI-HENG, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT
THE UNITED NATIONS: IDENTITY, ROLE AND FUNCTION 45-48 (1981); ACCREDITATION
SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 7 (stating NGOs participate in the U.N. via the ECOSOC as
consultants).
Consultative status resulted from pressure imposed by U.S. NGOs, the World
Trade Union Conference (W.T.U.C.), and smaller countries at the U.N. Conference on
International Organization in 1945. See CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD: THE INFLUENCE
OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE U.N. SYSTEM 25-27 (Peter Willets ed.,
1996). In a memorandum, W.T.U.C. requested participation rights at conferences and
special status in ECOSOC and the U.N. Security Council. See id. This memorandum
prompted other NGOs to request similar rights. See id. The issue was resolved with
adoption of Resolution 4(1) of the General Assembly, dated February 14, 1946, which
directed ECOSOC to provide for consultative relationships with certain NGOs. See PEIHENG, supra,at 85.
320.
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 20.
321.
ECOSOC, NGO Related Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.un.org/esa
coordination/ngo/faq.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006); see also E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note
57, art. 20 (describing the principles that guide the decisions on consultative arrangements).
322.
One scholar who has studied the relationship of NGOs and the U.N. has
described NGOs as "vital to U.N. work" and "virtually indispensable to the U.N. In
particular, their 'expertise ... diplomatic skills, good relationships and contacts, and a
clear vision about objectives' have proven useful" to the U.N. Wendy Schoener, NonGovernmental Organizations and Global Activism: Legal and Informal Approaches, 4
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 537, 550 (1997) (quoting Theo van Boven, The Role of NonGovernmental Organizations in International Human Rights Standard-Setting: A
Prerequisiteof Democracy, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 207, 224 (1990)).
323.
ECOSOC, NGO Related Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 321.
324.
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 1-2; see also, PEI-HENG, supra note
319, at 62 (describing how the "aims and purposes of an NGO must conform to the
spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N."); CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1070 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) (addressing
controversy of consultative relationship and approval process).
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conform to guidelines listed in Resolution 1996/31,325 which requires
the NGO to have "recognized standing" among organizations in the
"field of its competence or of a representative character. '32 6 For the
most part, these NGOs are international NGOs; national NGOs
qualify only in exceptional circumstances. 32 7 Each such NGO must
have an established headquarters and a democratically adopted
constitution with policymaking provisions. 328 In addition, the "basic
resources" of a consultative NGO must be derived mainly from
329
contributions of national affiliates or individual members.
The extent of an NGO's ability to contribute to, and participate
in, the work of ECOSOC depends upon the level of accreditation
granted by ECOSOC. 330 In other words, an NGO's rights, as well as
its obligations, are determined in accordance with a three-tier
accreditation system. Pursuant to this tiered system, NGOs can be
granted general consultative, special consultative, or roster
331
consultative status.
General consultative status provides the broadest prerogatives.
To qualify, NGOs must demonstrate that they "have substantive and
sustained contributions to make to the achievement of the objectives
to the United Nations ...and are closely involved with the economic
and social life of the peoples of the areas they represent and whose
membership, which should be considerable, is broadly representative
of major segments of society. ' 332 Generally, these qualifications limit
general consultative status to "large, well established international
'333
NGOs with a broad geographic reach.
Special consultative status is limited to NGOs that "are
concerned specifically withf only a few of the fields of activity covered
by the Council . . . and that are known within the fields for which

325.
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31 aims to be consistent with the principles and spirit of
the U.N. Charter. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 2.
326.
Id. art. 9.
327.
Id. art. 8.
328.

Id. art. 10, 12.

329.
Id. art. 13.
330.
Id. art. 24-32.
331.
Requests for consultative status are made by application. ECOSOC's
Committee on NGOs reviews applications on a biannual basis. ECOSOC, How to
Obtain Consultative Status with the ECOSOC, http://www.un.org/esalcoordination/ngol
howtoapply.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006). The Committee on NGOs has nineteen
member states that recommend decisions to ECOSOC. NGO Related Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 321. Decisions are made by ECOSOC itself. See ACCREDITATION
SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 8. Controversy, based on political issues, occasionally
surrounds the recommendations and decisions on NGOs' applications. See Dianne Otto,
Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of
International Civil Society, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 107, 114-16 (1996).

332.

E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 22.

333.

ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 8.
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they have or seek consultative status. '334 Roster consultative status
is conferred on NGOs that "can make occasional and useful
contributions to the work of the Council. 3 35
These three tiers accord formal participatory rights. But
regardless of the tier into which an NGO fits, an NGO does not have
any right to vote on matters deliberated by ECOSOC.33 6 Those NGOs
granted general consultative status have the most extensive rights,
33 7
including: (1) entitlement to receive ECOSOC provisional agendas;
(2) the ability to propose ECOSOC agenda items; 338 (3) the right to
designate representatives and to sit as observers at public meetings
of ECOSOC and its subsidiaries; 339 (4) entitlement to circulate
statements of 2,000 words at ECOSOC meetings and meetings of its
subsidiaries, with such statements published as U.N. documents and
circulated by the Secretariat; 40 (5) the right to speak at ECOSOC
meetings and those of its subsidiaries; 341 (6) entitlement to
participate in U.N. conferences; 342 and (7) entitlement to consult with
officers of sections of the Secretariat on matters of mutual concern or
343
interest.
NGOs granted special consultative status have many of the same
rights as those granted general consultative status. Special

334.
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 23; see ACCREDITATION SCHEMES,
supra note 240, at 8 (providing that Amnesty International is one NGO with special
status).
335.
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 24. Roster status may include
NGOs in consultative status with a specialized agency or another U.N. body. See
ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 8 (on special status).
336.
U.N. Charter arts. 69-70.
337.
ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 8.
338.
Id.
339.
Id.
340.
Id.
341.
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 32.
342.
Accredited NGOs may participate in formal meetings and may even
participate in some informal meetings. See ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240,
at 11 (discussing the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development).
Participation may include written presentations during a conference's preparatory
process, but such presentation will not necessarily be issued as an official U.N.
document. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 52. Nonetheless, some
conferences have adopted procedural rules that mandate distribution to all delegations
of NGOs' written statements "in the quantity and language in which they are made
available" at the NGOs' expense. Rules of Procedure of the International Conference on
Population and Development, R. 65-66, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/171/2 (1994). Those NGOs
accredited for a conference may designate representatives to sit as observers and "may
make oral statements on questions [specifically offered to the NGOs by the presiding
officer] in which they have 'special competence."' Id. Where requests to speak exceed
the number allowable, NGOs can form constituencies "to speak through
spokespersons," thus assuring vocal representation. Id. At times, participating NGOs
may be invited to make drafting inputs to official policy materials generated as a result
of the conference. See ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 11 (discussing the
1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development).
343.
See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 63.
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consultative NGOs are denied, however, the rights to propose
ECOSOC agenda items 344 and to speak at ECOSOC meetings (but
345
they can speak at the meetings of ECOSOC subsidiary bodies).
Moreover, their statements circulated at ECOSOC meetings are
limited to 500 words, and those circulated at meeting of ECOSOC's
346
subsidiaries are limited to 1,500 words.
More limited rights are conferred upon NGOs accorded roster
consultative status. Such NGOs can (1) receive ECOSOC provisional
agendas, 347 (2) designate representatives at a public meeting of
ECOSOC or a subsidiary body if such meeting concerns matters
within the NGO's particular area of competence, 348 (3) be invited to
U.N. conferences, 34 9 and (4) be entitled to consult with officers of
sections of the Secretariat on matters of mutual concern or
350
interest.
These rules have permitted NGOs with consultative status to
regularly be a non-voting but integral public influence on global
affairs. This positive attribute is tempered, however. Because the
accreditation criteria imposed result in excluding national NGOs and
in including largely Western NGOs, critics have suggested that these
influences can be skewed. 35 1 Nonetheless, the consultative NGOs
generally are perceived as a reliable and centralized source to which
U.N. delegates and the public can turn for identification of issues, as
well as education and technical advice with respect to those matters.
Their published materials and oral statements become part of the
public record and official dialogue, and thus they have significant
public accountability. 352 The consultative NGOs'
working
relationships with sections of the Secretariat and section programs,
as well as their participation in conferences and other official forums,
help to shape not only the policy issues presented to U.N. delegates
and the world but also the policy outcomes. 353 Such attributes should

344.
items).
345.

See id. art. 28 (on special consultative status of NGOs in proposing agenda
Id. art. 32.

ACCREDITATION SCHEMES, supra note 240, at 8.
347.
E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 27.
348.
Id. art. 35.
349.
Id. arts. 41-54.
350.
Id. art. 64.
351.
See, e.g., Otto, supra note 331, at 120 (burgeoning number of NGOs seeking
to participate in U.N. conferences).
352.
See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 57, art. 61(c) (NGOs with general and
special consultative status are also formally accountable to the U.N. They must file
quadrennial reports with the Committee on NGOs),
353.
For example, consultative NGOs involved in the U.N. Environmental
Program have been credited with having significant impact on the production of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. See Wirth, supra note
346.

299, at 22-26.
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be imported into a new presidential foreign health policymaking
system.
B. A ConstitutionallyAcceptable Revised PresidentialForeign Health

Policymaking Structure
The remainder of this Article focuses on proposing a formulation

for a new presidential foreign health policymaking arrangement. The
proposal conceives of using an existing structure, a Presidential
Advisory Committee, as one part of the system. For reasons set forth

below, an additional supplementary

structure, an Assembly of

Nonprofit Entities, is envisioned. The Article suggests that together
these two components can enhance and strengthen the president's
policymaking on global health matters through greater inclusiveness
of voices at his policymaking table.
1.

A Presidential Advisory Committee

Since nearly the birth of our nation, presidents have created
advisory committees for the purpose of directly soliciting their
354
members' specialized expert opinions, ideas, and recommendations.

In modern times, presidents have sought advice on a range of topics,
including ecosystems and health care, and consequently have directly

established advisory committees. 3 5 5 Since 1972, Presidential Advisory
Committees have operated under the administrative procedural
requisites and restrictions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
3 56

(FACA).

FACA describes the term "Presidential Advisory Committee" as
"an advisory committee that advises the President. ' 357 The Act more

broadly defines "advisory committee" as a

354.
5 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2005); see Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal
Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 458 (1997)
(stating that from the early days of the nation, presidents have formed advisory
committees). In modern times, advisory committees have operated under every
administration, and until 1972, their procedural requirements were not statutorily
defined. See id. at 459-60 (discussing Exec. Order No. 11,007, 3 C.F.R. 182 (Feb. 26,
1962) issued by President Kennedy, and Exec. Order No. 11,671, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,307
(June 5, 1972) issued by President Nixon).
355.
For example, President Clinton formed the Forest Ecosystem Management
Team for ecological advice. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp 1009 (D.D.C.
1994). A Presidential Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the
Health Care Industry exists, as does a Presidential Council on Bioethics. See
Presidential Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health
Care Industry, http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov (last visited Sept. 17, 2006);
President's Council on Bioethics, http://www.bioethics.gov (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
356.
Pub. L. No. 92-453, 86 Stat. 770 (Oct. 6, 1972) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2005)).
357.
5 U.S.C. app. § 3(4) (2005).
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committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or
other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof...
which is(A)

established by statute or reorganization plan, or

(B)

established or utilized by the President, or

(C)

established or utilized by one or more agencies,

in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the
President or one or more agencies or officers of the Federal
358
Government.

The Supreme Court described the term "advisory committee" as
having "almost unfettered breadth." 359 Nonetheless, FACA has
several express exclusions from the definition of an "advisory
committee. ' 360 Moreover, the courts have held that a group that is
principally operational and is not functionally a direct advisor to the
president is not considered a Presidential Advisory Committee under
FACA. 361 Thus, a Presidential Advisory Committee is solely advisory
3 62
in function; it is not a decision-making body.
Congress designed FACA to enhance governmental transparency
and accountability. 363 Numerous provisions in FACA attempt to
make such an advisory committee publicly accountable. Pursuant to
FACA, the public and Congress must be kept apprised of a

358.
§ 3(2). Thus, FACA permits establishment of an advisory committee by a
president, by federal legislation, or by an executive agency if in the public interest.
§§ 2, 3(2), 9(a)(1)-(2). FACA does not permit the formation of an advisory committee by
a federal court. §§ 2, 3(3); see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 92
F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 1996) (committee established to assist the judiciary not an advisory
committee as contemplated by FACA); Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, 17 F. 3d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (committee created to advise judiciary on
sentencing guidelines not an advisory committee as contemplated by FACA).
359.
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 n.8 (1989).
360.
Section 3 of FACA excludes the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental
Relations (5 U.S.C.A. app. 2 § 3(2)(i) (West 2005)), the Commission on Government
Procurement (5 U.S.C.A. app. 2 § 3(2)(ii) (West 2005)), any committee that is composed
wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time officers and employees of the federal
government, (5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C) (West 2005)), and any committee created by the
National Academy of Sciences or the National Academy of Public Administration (5
U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C) (West 2005)). Additionally, FACA does not apply to any advisory
committee established or utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal
Reserve System (5 U.S.C.A. app. 2 § 4(b) (West 2005)), to any local or civic group
rendering a public service with respect to a federal program (5 U.S.C.A. app. 2 § 4(c)
(West 2005)), or to any state or local committee established to advise or make
recommendations to state or local officials or agencies (5 U.S.C.A. app. 2 § 4(c) (West
2005)).
361.
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 76 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
362.
5 U.S.C. app. § 9(b) (2005). See Metcalf v. Nat'l Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d
176 (D.C. 1977) (standing and 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(b)).
363.
Reacting to the Watergate scandals, Congress enacted the FACA to
increase public confidence in executive agencies and the president by reducing public
concerns about the interactions of these governmental officials and persons
representing special interests. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2005) (findings and purpose).
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Presidential Advisory Committee's functional scope, objectives,
membership, and activities. 364 Prior to its first meeting, a
Presidential Advisory Committee must have a charter that states its
purpose36 5 and limits its duration to a two-year term366 that may be
renewable with proper justification.3 67 FACA requires the meetings of
an advisory committee generally to be open to the public3 68 and to be
chaired or attended by a designated federal government official.3 69
Records of the advisory committee must be publicly disclosed and
available,37 0 subject to nine possible exemptions under the Freedom
371
of Information Act.
In addition to the focus on transparency and accountability,
FACA attempts to ensure that a Presidential Advisory Committee is
well rounded, and its advice is unbiased. Accordingly, the advisory
committee's membership composition must be "fairly balanced in
terms of the points of view represented,"3 72 and the committee's

364.
365.

Id. § 2(5).
Id. § 9(c) requires:

Such charter shall contain the following information:
(A) the committee's official designation;
(B) the committee's objectives and the scope of its activity;
(C) the period of time necessary for the committee to carry out its purposes;
(D) the agency or official to whom the committee reports;
(E) the agency responsible for providing the necessary
committee;

support for the

(F) a description of the duties for which the committee is responsible, and, if
such duties are not solely advisory, a specification of the authority for
such functions;
(G) the estimated annual operating costs in dollars and man-years for such
committee;
(H) the estimated number and frequency of committee meetings;
(I) the committee's termination date, if less than two years from the date of
the committee's establishment; and
(J) the date the charter is filed.
366.
Id. § 14(a)(1).
367.
Id. § 14(a)(2).
368.
Id. § 10(a) (providing that open meetings are required unless the president
determines national security requires otherwise).
369.
Id. § 10(e). A Presidential Advisory Committee need not have its agenda
approved by a government official prior to its meeting. Id. § 10(f).
370.
Transcripts of advisory committee meetings must be made available to the
public. Id. § 10 (b).
371.
Records include committee reports, minutes, working papers, drafts,
studies, agendas, etc. Id. § 10(b).
372.
Pursuant to § 2(b)(2), any legislation establishing an advisory committee
must require that the membership of such committee is "fairly balanced." The courts
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advice must be free of inappropriate influences "by the appointing
'37 3
authority or by any special interest.
2.

A New Presidential Advisory Committee on U.S. Foreign
Health Policy

The major characteristics of a Presidential Advisory
Committee-(1) its establishment by the president for the explicit
purpose of his directly receiving informed opinions, advice, and
recommendations of individuals having special expertise, who
cumulatively are fairly balanced and whose advice will not represent
any one special interest; (2) its transparency; and (3) its public
accountability-fit several of the important criteria for placing the
nonprofit sector in a meaningful official role in U.S. foreign health
policymaking. The president could create and meaningfully utilize a
new Presidential Advisory Committee on U.S. Foreign Health Policy,
the membership of which should be representatives of domestic
nonprofits that are involved in and have special knowledge of global
health matters affecting marginalized minorities abroad. The
Committee members, a small number by necessity, should represent
the broad spectrum of global health grant-making institutions, U.S.
based international health service oriented entities, and health policy
and treatment research organizations-that is, private foundations,
3 74
public charities, academic institutions, and think tanks.
A Presidential Advisory Committee on U.S. Foreign Health
Policy could help remedy the weaknesses described earlier. Such a
knowledgeable group would have direct access to the president and
could offer the president insights and counsel based on varied
experiences, sources of information and data, and perspectives. The
proposed Presidential Advisory Committee could provide a forum for
sincere engagement, debate, and constructive interchange on
emerging and ongoing global health issues impacting marginalized
minorities abroad, 375 could reinforce the appropriate direction for

have interpreted this requirement to extend to an advisory committee established by
the executive branch. See Nat'l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Executive Cmty. of President's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Nat'l Nutritional
Foods Ass'n V. Califano, 603 F. 2d 327 (2d Cir. 1979).
373.
5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(3)-(c) (2005).
374.
Although nonprofit organizations might prefer to select representatives to
the Presidential Advisory Committee, of course the selection of its members is the
president's decision. To attempt broad and unbiased representation, the president
should seek to appoint Committee members representative of liberal and conservative,
large and small, wealthy and more financially challenged nonprofit organizations that
are critically involved in global health matters. The president might consider leaders
from some of the nonprofit sector umbrella organizations, such as the Council on
Foundations and the Independent Sector, for membership on the Committee. Id.
375.
To be effective, a president would need to take the Presidential Advisory
Committee seriously and meaningfully utilize its expertise. Unlike President Reagan's
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foreign health policy, and could facilitate policy execution. Such a
Committee also would give nonprofits a real stake in the process and,
ultimately, in implementation of the final policy adopted by the
foreign policy decisionmaker, the president. The suggested
Presidential Advisory Committee on U.S. Foreign Health Policy also
would provide a formal institutionalized means of enhancing
democratic participation in policymaking on global health matters for
at least an experimental period of two years, 76the initial statutory
3
duration of a Presidential Advisory Committee.
Nonetheless, the proposed Presidential Advisory Committee
lacks an element crucial to a new presidential foreign policymaking
regime. Although as conceived the Committee's membership would
broadly represent nonprofits involved in, and concerned about, global
health matters, it necessarily must be limited in number.
Consequently, this suggested Presidential Advisory Committee
structure alone cannot provide institutionalized opportunities for the
broad spectrum of nonprofits to have input and exchanges on
emerging and ongoing important global health matters, the outcomes
of which should be shared with the president. Therefore, an
additional vital facet must be designed and coupled with the proposed
Presidential Advisory Committee to ensure that many nonprofit
voices with relevant worldwide experience or knowledge are
considered in the advice ultimately represented to the president.
3.

An Assembly of Nonprofit Entities

Many of the paradigms discussed in Part V.A. above, including
the ECOSOC, the OECD, the WHO, and the ILO, incorporate a
means to engage NGOs in a consultative capacity and to harvest their
expertise, experiences, and research to benefit policymaking
processes. Some models, such as ECOSOC and the OECD, establish
accreditation criteria to select a spectrum of representative NGOs to
participate in the processes. For example, ECOSOC has an elaborate
tiered system that confers participatory rights on NGOs in
policymaking processes in accordance with their perceived ability to
contribute to the processes. 377 Those NGOs conferred "general
consultative" status as a result of their demonstrated substantive and

Presidential Advisory Committee on HIV, formation of such a Presidential Advisory
Committee cannot be an empty or symbolic gesture. See supra notes 31, 81 and
accompanying text.
376.
FACA limits the duration of a Presidential Advisory Committee to two
years. 5 U.S.C. app. § 14(a)(1) (2005). The two-year duration, however, can be
extended. Id. § 14(a)(2). Additionally, Congress could enact legislation to exempt a
Presidential Advisory Committee on U.S. foreign health matters from FACA. See supra
note 360 (listing some advisory committee exemptions from FACA).
377.
See supra Part V.A.6 (U.N.'s Economic & Social Council).
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sustained contributions to U.N. objectives are accorded the broadest
prerogatives. Their privileges include rights to attend ECOSOC
meetings and conferences, circulate statements for publication and
consideration, speak at ECOSOC meetings, participate at U.N.
conferences, and consult with ECOSOC leaders on matters of mutual
concern. Those NGOs granted "special consultative" status because of
their ability to make occasional and useful contributions to the U.N.'s
goals are allowed more limited rights, but they can participate,
without speaking, at ECOSOC meetings and can circulate limited
statements at those meetings. Finally, "roster consultative" NGOs are
permitted more limited privileges, but they, too, have formal
participatory rights at ECOSOC meetings and U.N. conferences.
A new presidential foreign health policymaking structure should
engage a broad spectrum of domestic nonprofit organizations that
make grants; undertake research; organize or perform field work; or
otherwise directly support, advocate for, or impact global health
matters affecting marginalized minorities abroad. It is essential that
their expertise, concerns, and insights inform the president. This flow
of information can be accomplished indirectly through the president's
advisors on a Presidential Advisory Committee for Foreign Health
Policy. In other words, the nonprofits must meet formally with, be
considered advisors to, and be represented by the members on such a
Presidential Advisory Committee. 3 78 To this end, appropriate forums
and procedures must be developed.
The paradigms of international policymaking bodies offer a
potentially effective approach. Forums for discussion, debate and
presentation, meetings, and conferences can be held both among the
nonprofits and between those entities and the Presidential Advisory
Committee members. Over time, at these meetings and conferences
incipient and intensifying health concerns may be shared, global
health matters ripe for inclusion on a U.S. foreign health policy
agenda should be identified, formulations of responsive health policy
could be suggested, and advice on implementation could be
communicated.
To select a representative array of nonprofits to participate in
such forums, accreditation standards might be developed. Like the
accreditation standards used in several paradigms, a tiered approach
might be created to ensure the greatest participatory privileges to
those nonprofits with the most direct or broadest involvement in
global health matters.

378.
These NGOs would not be considered an advisory committee within FACA
because the members would not be direct advisors to the president or an executive
branch agency. It would not be established by either the president or an executive
branch agency. It would function as an informational source and in an advisory
capacity to members of the proposed Presidential Advisory Committee on U.S. Foreign
Health Policy.
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The exact contours and parameters of such an Assembly of
Nonprofit Entities must be considered in far greater detail than this
Article can present. There are many particulars that need
addressing-the selection criteria for nonprofits' participation, the
formal operational structure of the Assembly, whether the nonprofits
should present consensus positions to members of the Presidential
Advisory Committee, etc. Nonetheless, there are existing models,
some of which are discussed in Part V.A. above, that could be quite
helpful in developing the necessary structural and procedural details.
The ultimate structure should enable many nonprofit entities with
specialized experiences, insights, knowledge, and capabilities to
valuably contribute to the president's foreign health policymaking
endeavor.

VI. CONCLUSION
This Article suggested that the constraints and weaknesses of
the current presidential foreign health policymaking process warrant
its alteration. Seeking to foster greater public accountability and
bring a new legitimacy to presidential foreign policymaking, it
advocated the adoption of a structure offering a more transparent,
better informed, and balanced enterprise. And, attempting to ensure
that strategic U.S. concerns and global humanitarian, economic,
social, political, and security interests are adequately and
appropriately served, the Article promoted adoption of an approach
that enhances the inclusiveness of concerned voices represented at
the president's foreign policymaking table. Based on several
paradigms offering valuable attributes, the Article suggested two new
structures: a Presidential Advisory Board on U.S. Foreign Health
Policy, composed of nonprofit organization representatives and an
Assembly of Nonprofit Entities. This arrangement is proposed as a
meaningful approach to officially integrating into the president's
foreign health policymaking processes U.S. nonprofits that can assist
in identifying incipient and intensifying global health problems and
needs, in recommending responsive formulations and policy options,
and in protecting vital U.S. interests.

